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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

Conservative Revolutionary Intellectuals in the Weimar Republic and National Socialist
Germany: Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Jϋnger

This thesis will examine the writings and career/life paths of three conservative
revolutionary intellectuals during the Weimar Republic and National Socialist Germany.
The purpose of this examination is not only to provide an overview of the development
of conservative revolutionary thought in Germany after World War I, but also to
investigate the influence these intellectuals had on the National Socialists’ seizure and
consolidation of power. The works and lives of three important intellectuals will be
examined: Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Jϋnger. In combination with
scholarly secondary literature, this thesis will be based mostly on translated primary
writings.
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INTRODUCTION

The National Socialist reign in Germany is one of the most popular areas of study
in contemporary European History. In retrospect, it is extremely difficult to fathom how
an entire nation could follow a leader such as Adolf Hitler; a man who had such extreme
and racist views. It is difficult to grasp the concept of how a nation as modernized as
Germany could not only let a man with such a corrupt sense of right and wrong into
power, but then follow him blindly, and help him commit one of the most diabolical plans
in history, the Holocaust.
In order to truly dissect this problem, the first step necessary is to move beyond
the incorrect, preconceived notions that run rampant today in terms of how Hitler came
to power, and what the actual social climate of Germany was in the early twentieth
century. In regards to the first problem it is a major misconception of its own to say that
Adolf Hitler was chosen to be head of government in Germany. It is popularly thought
that Hitler was elected by the majority of eligible voters in Germany to be the head of
government, but this is not true. The most votes he and the National Socialist German
Workers’ Party (NSDAP) earned was in the election held in March of 1933, even though
the election was held under conditions of political duress, and the political left was
greatly suppressed. Another concept that is often forgotten is the fact that Hitler was
never elected as dictator. Although he was elected to the Reichstag, Hitler was
appointed Chancellor by President Hindenburg. Hitler soon passed the Enabling Act,
which allowed him to write himself in as acting Dictator of Germany, essentially killing
the Weimar Republic.
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It is also important to describe the social climate of Germany at the beginning of
the twentieth century. After a devastating defeat in World War I, Germany succumbed
to a downward-spiral. Not only did German society have to deal with the agony and
humiliation of defeat, they also had to cope with the embarrassment of taking the blame
for initiating the conflict. Germany was also given the responsibility of paying
reparations for the damages of the war all across the European continent which
enhanced these hardships even more. Everything combined, Germany’s core
infrastructure was in tatters. What may have been the most devastating part of the loss
in the war was what the German people at home had to endure. The majority of war
propaganda in Germany from World War I that was shown to the German people at the
home front made it seem like Germany was winning the war. When the armistice was
signed to end the war, the German people were surprised and angry to find that they
were on the losing end. The “Stab-in-the-Back Legend” became a popular myth after
the war. This concept stated that certain people—identified by the NSDAP as the Jews,
Social Democrats, liberals, and the Communists—had betrayed the country and caused
the defeat. Myths such as this became widespread after the war, and when a series of
inflation, rationalization, and depression hit Germany throughout the 1920s, they
resulted in panic and hatred that could be used by certain people in order to manipulate
and coerce society into subscribing to a certain belief or series of actions.
A second step to correcting the preconceived notions about the Nazi reign in
Germany is reconsidering the role of right-wing intellectuals. Examining several of
these intellectuals is the aim of the following discussion. Thoughts and theories of the
conservative-revolutionary intellectuals will be discussed and analyzed in order to
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demonstrate how the socio-economic and political conditions during Weimar made it
possible for these three influential figures to spread their theories, and in certain cases,
to promote their individual careers and aspirations. The three men examined here
represent three genres of writing: political, philosophical, and literary. Though much of
this examination will focus on the textual works, the actions of the intellectuals will also
be discussed and examined. The political sphere will be represented by Carl Schmitt;
the philosophical sphere by Martin Heidegger, and the literary sphere by Ernst Jϋnger.
With their writings and actions, these three intellectuals established themselves as
leaders in their specific fields and may have even played a part in the growth of National
Socialist sentiments in the 1920s and early 1930s.
This discussion will examine Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Jϋnger in
respect to how their writings and theories influenced and resonated with National
Socialism during and after the Weimar period in Germany. Although some instances,
as in the case of Martin Heidegger’s theories, might seem directly linked to National
Socialist ideals, they may need to be examined in greater depth in order to reveal the
actual reasoning behind their writings and actions. Whether directly or indirectly, these
men indeed made a profound impact in regards to the negative emotions felt towards
the Weimar Republic, and positive emotions felt towards a conservative revolution
driven by a group such as the National Socialist German Workers’ Party.
The basis for this discussion will be the primary works of the three men in
question, as well as supplementary examination of secondary works composed by
contemporary scholars. Understanding the socio-economic climate provides a
necessary historical context for understanding the theories of the three men. In the first
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short chapter, I will briefly discuss the time period after the armistice of World War I.
The next three chapters will address Schmitt, Heidegger, and Jϋnger. Each chapter will
begin with a brief biographical sketch, followed by an analysis of their early writings and
early career developments, their writings during the Weimar period—when each of
these men expressed their most significant ideas and themes—and, finally, their
writings during Nazi reign. The conclusion will examine their writings as a whole, and
compare them to the rest of their career in their respective fields. The conclusion will
also briefly assess of each individual’s impact on the growth of National Socialist
sentiments in Germany, and how their career paths were related to the ideals
expressed in their writings. In short, this thesis will attempt to establish a coherent
analysis of Schmitt, Heidegger, and Jϋnger individually, as well as of how their efforts
combined in order to abet the popularity and/or legitimacy of the NSDAP.

5

CHAPTER 1

WELCOME TO WEIMAR

A nation in extreme turmoil, the state of interwar Germany was one of instability.
Coming off of a debilitating defeat in World War I, Germany was in dire need of a new
beginning. In combination with its defeat in the Great War, Germany was also put into
further debt by the victors. The Versailles Treaty that was ratified in June, 1919 placed
a great deal of hardship on the nation of Germany. Not only did it have to deal with the
loss and blame for the war, it was also charged with paying reparations for the
destruction throughout Western Europe. Although it may be debated by historians such
as Detlev Peukert whether or not the reparations were as big of a burden as many
historians generally claim, dealing with the bills, along with all of the other charges from
the defeat of World War I made Germany, at the very least, a nation heavily in debt .1
As some historians and authors have been quick to point out, the reparation bills
that were imposed upon Germany were not the only cause of the turmoil to which the
nation later succumbed. The “War Guilt Clause” of the Treaty was also a major issue
for German society. Defeat in war was enough trauma for a nation to endure, but
having to bear the blame for beginning the war even beginning was an additional
hardship for many German people. Additionally, due to the propaganda that was being
used, the home front during the war, believed that Germany and its allies were
decisively winning the war.

1

Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, Translated by Richard
Deveson, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992).
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In addition to the list of issues that the Versailles Treaty prescribed for Germany
in terms of economic and social troubles, the political structure of the nation was in
shambles. Germany was in need of a new government. The Empire had collapsed and
the German people demanded that politics move in a new direction; the new direction
being a Republic. With the civil unrest that was rampant after the war, the Republic was
to become a symbol of hope for a rebirth of the German nation. In short, the Weimar
Republic in Germany was an effort to stabilize and to bring stability to a nation that was
emerging from an emotionally devastating defeat in war. In an era of rapid
modernization, supporters of the Republic hoped it would be able to modernize the
nation and bring it out of the depths of defeat.
Many believe that the Weimar Republic in Germany was destined to fail due to
the conditions that it had to endure in interwar Germany. Though this is generally what
is thought about Weimar Germany, a new concept is also being debated. This is the
concept that Weimar was not a complete and utter failure. There are several historians
who believe that the Weimar was in fact an era of great social progress. Three
historians of the Weimar era, Eric D. Weitz, Detlev Peukert, and Peter Gay, have
discussed the progress that was made during the Weimar era of Germany. They
believe that Weimar possessed promising institutions that failed due to the combination
of the Treaty of Versailles, the fragmented political parties of the time, and poor
economic conditions. Several areas of society were greatly improved during Weimar
including, but not limited to, architecture, art, sound (phonograph and radio) and
imaging technologies (photograph and fast-printing, printing presses), the performing
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arts, philosophy and the liberalization of gender and sexual norms; on top of all that
there was a solid economic recovery between 1924 and 1929.
This thesis will examine how three intellectuals, directly or indirectly, provided
ideological justification for the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. These writers
helped set the stage for the Nazi Party to enter the framework of Weimar Germany, and
to turn the country upside-down. This thesis will examine three major intellectual areas
of the German Nation in the 1920s and 1930s: the political, philosophical, and literary
spheres.
In terms of these three different intellectual spheres, Germany was in a unique
position, because it had representatives who were leaders not only of their own nation,
but also arguably of Europe as a whole in their respective areas. Carl Schmitt will
represent the political sphere in this thesis. Although there are many issues that
contemporary historians have debated regarding his theories, there can be no doubt
that he was not one of, if not the most influential political theorist in Germany in the early
part of the twentieth century. In terms of political theorists, Schmitt was extremely
flexible, which is one of the major reasons that contemporary historians and theorists
find inconsistencies and even contradictions in his ideas throughout his career.
Although there are historians that find his shifting political stances problematic, his
different ideas are what make him so unique, dynamic, and extremely important when
studying the Weimar period in Germany.
With regard to the philosophical sphere, we will examine the works and career of
the important twentieth-century German philosopher, Martin Heidegger. There is much
debate on the relationship of Heidegger to the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich.

8

Most commentators have argued that Heidegger believed that only good would come
from the Nazi reign in Germany and that, although he did not truly believe in everything
that Hitler and the Nazi Party were doing, he did believe that what they were doing
would ultimately lead to a desirable conclusion. Though there is a debate concerning
what his actual vision of the Nazi Party was, one theme is consistent through his career:
opportunism.
The literary sphere is represented by a soldier, writer, and a veteran of World
War I: Ernst Jϋnger. Bursting onto the scene writing about his experiences in the Great
War, Jϋnger glorified the trials, tribulations and hardships of war and battle. His many
writings have caused quite a debate among contemporary historical and literary
scholars because there are several different ways in which they can be interpreted.
Although his texts glorify war and death, he never joined the inner circle of the Nazi
Party—even though he was invited to do so. These divergent interpretations are due to
the fact the content of his writings was closely related to the views and theories of the
National Socialists.
The political, philosophical, and literary spheres of the Weimar Republic and the
Third Reich played major roles in determining the fateful course of Germany in the early
part of twentieth-century. These three spheres were significantly shaped by the writings
and career paths of Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Jϋnger.

9

Economics

One issue that proved to be extremely problematic throughout the Weimar
Republic was the economic disasters that plagued the nation twice during Weimar’s
existence.2 Although the Great Depression in particular occurred throughout much of
the world, economic crises hit especially hard in Germany due to its loss of World War I.
With all of the war debt that German leaders had incurred in order to finance the war,
along with the reparations that Germany had to pay, the crises which hit after the war
proved to be devastating in Germany.
The economic crises which Germany had to endure after the war are generally
split into three separate and distinct phases. As Eric D. Weitz explains, the phases
were that of inflation, rationalization, and depression.3 Hyperinflation was due to the
immense war debt that the German government incurred throughout the duration of the
war, as well as the reparation payments that were inflicted upon Germany. In order to
compensate for the reparations that needed to be paid due to the loss in World War I,
they raised prices to increase national profits. Consumer prices went up, and many
workers went on strike due to wage and hour issues. With the workers going on strike,
the nation had no choice but to acquiesce to the demands made by the workforce.
Although the workforce technically ended the 1921 workers’ strike victoriously, not much
effectively was changed. The issues concerned with wages and hours were dealt with,
but the economy was still suffering. The workforce was getting higher wages, but the
currency in which they were being paid was depreciating. This monetary depreciation
2

The first being hyper-inflation and the second being the Great Crash.
Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007),
149.

3
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was also due to French occupation of the Ruhr, which led the government to print an
overabundance of currency. Thus, inflation was followed by hyperinflation. This
hyperinflation caused the currency of Germany to become almost worthless.
Stabilization projects were then put into effect. The most significant of these
stabilization projects was the one conjured up by Gustav Stresemann and Wilhelm
Marx. This project, in conjunction with the Dawes and Young Plans, not only created a
more coherent payment plan for Germany’s reparations, but also vacated Allied forces
from the Ruhr. These stabilization projects eventually succeeded and assisted in
reviving the German economy in 1924. The successful conclusion of the stabilization
projects ushered in the “Golden Years” of Weimar Germany in the mid-1920s. These
“Golden Years” were marked by immense changes in the social atmosphere in
Germany. During this period workers’ living standards began to steadily improve, and
there was increased faith in the credit system.
Rationalization was the next step for the nation. Rationalization is the
“application of scientific methods to production in order to expand output with less
labor.”4 Germany began to look at the United States as the model of rationalization.
German industrial leaders were in awe of America’s rate of production and consumption
as well as their efficiency and effectiveness in production. Germany began to use more
modern methods and technologies in the workplace. Although wages increased
slightly, the major disadvantage of rationalization was the drastic increase in
unemployment. Both the industrial and agrarian workforce was adversely affected. Life
was turned upside-down for most Germans who became impoverished. Even those

4

Ibid.
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that succeeded in these “Golden Years” were soon to be upended by the Stock-Market
Crash in December of 1929.
Although the stock market Crash began in the United States, it severely impacted
Germany. The Great Crash in the United States began a sort of domino effect that
spanned across the world. With the United States spinning into a financial crisis, one of
their first maneuvers was to recall the short-term loans that had been given to Germany
through the Dawes and Young Plans to help with reparations. The loss of these shortterm loans sent Germany straight into a financial crisis that quickly developed into a
crisis of production. With the economic issues that Germany was facing at the time of
the World Economic Crisis, it was forced to downsize its workforce and cut numerous
jobs. In 1930 almost one-third of the workforce was officially unemployed. Weitz states
that statisticians did not count another two million “unofficially” unemployed Germans
which would account for 40 percent of the workforce.5 In turn, Germany also went into
a period of deflation between the years of 1930 and 1933. But this deflationary period
failed to stimulate the economy in any significant way.

Politics

The political conditions in Weimar Germany were extremely tense. The Weimar
Republic was initially proclaimed on November 9, 1918, and although there was some
hope for it to succeed, it was almost immediately denied legitimacy by large sections of
the German population. Due to several differences in opinion, the constitution that was
5

Ibid., 161.
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drafted was quickly transformed into a list of compromises. One article, in particular, of
the Weimar constitution was to have fateful consequences for the Republic: Article 48.
It stated:
If a state does not fulfill the obligations laid upon it by the Reich constitution or
Reich laws, the Reich President may use armed force to cause it to oblige. In
case public safety is seriously threatened or disturbed, the Reich President may
take the measures necessary to reestablish law and order, if necessary using
armed force. In the pursuit of this aim, he may suspend the civil rights described
in articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153, partially or entirely. The Reich
President must inform the Reichstag immediately about all measures undertaken
based on paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article. The measures must be suspended
immediately if the Reichstag so demands. If danger is imminent, the state
government may, for their specific territory, implement steps as described in
paragraph 2. These steps may be suspended if so demanded by the Reich
President or the Reichstag. Further details may be regulated by Reich
legislation.6
Although rule by emergency decree had been put in place by Heinrich Brϋning already
in 1930, Article 48 would acquire additional significance in Hitler’s consolidation of
power in 1933.
Outside of the Weimar constitution, there was a thriving political world with many
diverse active parties. In the early 1920s no clear leader had emerged among the
different political parties. During this time Germany had a wider range of free speech
than any other country; that is until a public speaking ban was put in place from 1924
until 1927.7 The extreme right of the political world during Weimar idealized violence
and racial anti-Semitism while the left idealized militarism due to the Bolshevik
Revolution. Representing the political left was the Communist Party (KPD).
Representing the political right was the German National People’s Party (DNVP), the

6

“Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919,” University of South Alabama, URL =
<http://www.southalabama.edu/history/faculty/rogers/348/article48.html>. [accessed May 14, 2013].
7
Weitz, 83.
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German Peoples’ Party (DVP), and the National Socialist German Worker’s Party
(NSDAP). Representing the political center was the Weimar Coalition which consisted
of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the German Democratic Party (DDP), and the
Catholic Center Party.8 With so many different political groupings there was much
political dissension during the Weimar Republic. As a result German society was a
disoriented and disillusioned community.9
Weimar, between the years of 1918 and 1924 and 1929 and 1933, were periods
of duress and instability. Economically, Germany was constantly in flux. Once it was
stabilized in 1924, it was quickly shattered again by the Great Crash in 1929. Politically,
Weimar saw more instability. During the reign of the Weimar Republic, there was
constant call for revisions or change, mostly due to the inability of the republic to
stabilize the economy for a prolonged period of time. This instability of the economic
and political systems gave political and social organizations, such as the NSDAP, the
opportunity to gain public support. This thesis will examine how Carl Schmitt, Martin
Heidegger, and Ernst Jϋnger may have further influenced the German people to fall in
line with National Socialist ideology, and any motivations these men had in doing so.

8

These are examples of the larger political parties that were represented. Many smaller parties also
existed during the Weimar Republic due to the “5% hurdle.”
9
Peukert, 245-246.
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CHATPER 2

CARL SCHMITT

Carl Schmitt is essential to any examination of interwar German politics. This
section will chronologically outline his primary writings in a coherent and contextual
manner. Beginning with a brief biography, the discussion will then examine Schmitt’s
writings from his early period, during Weimar, and under the Third Reich. Though it can
be argued that his writings lack a clear political ideal, this discussion will show how
many of his fundamental principles remain firm throughout his interwar career.
Focusing on writings through and after Weimar, this discussion will show how, although
he argues that he supported the Weimar Republic, he consistently maintained political
ideals that contradicted those realized with the Weimar Constitution.

A Biographical Glimpse

Carl Schmitt, a German jurist, University Professor of Law, and legal theorist,
was born in 1888 in Plettenberg, Germany. Schmitt was a widely renowned political,
legal, and constitutional theorist in Germany during Weimar Germany and National
Socialist Germany in the early 20th century. Still controversial today, many of his most
influential writings were based on the principle that there is a decisive need for a strong
central government in order to further the interests of the nation; that a republic which is
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based upon liberal democracy and deliberation would never be able to express the
unified will of the people. Schmitt believed that a liberal democracy would ultimately
harm the people, and the government, because nothing could ever be completed in a
satisfactory manner. He believed that no party in the deliberation process would be
appeased if it needed to agree to some sort of compromise which would inhibit its
desires and/or needs. More importantly, he believed that all parties should be
subordinated to the will of the state.
Carl Schmitt gained admittance to the Friedrich-Wilhelm University of Berlin,10
which at the time was “the pinnacle of the university system and thus one of the
greatest universities in the world.”11 Although he originally desired to pursue an
education at the university level in the field of philology, he was quickly persuaded by
one of his uncles to modify his studies “in the more practical direction of
jurisprudence.”12 After passing the assessor’s examination and with the outbreak of
World War I, Schmitt enrolled in the German Reserve Infantry. After recovering from a
back injury in basic training for the reserve infantry, he eventually rose through the
ranks and was promoted to sergeant in the censorship sector of the regional martial law
administration for the General Command of Army Corps 1 in Munich.13
When World War I began, Schmitt began to develop some of his own personal
intellectual ideals. Schmitt went against the popular mantra of nationalism during war.
When the war began he “did not share the initial belligerent enthusiasm of his

10

In 1949 Friedrich-Wilhelm University was renamed the Humboldt University
Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (New York: Verso, 2000), 13.
12
Ibid., 13.
13
Ibid., 16.
11

16

countrymen.”14 The fact that many of his earliest works do not reference the idea of
qualities and virtues specific to the German people is noteworthy because, as Gopal
Balakrishnan notes, it shows just how detached Schmitt was from the German people
as a whole, especially during what Balakrishnan designates, with just cause, as the
“defining experience of his generation.”15
Although he illuminates the fact that Schmitt may have, early in his lengthy
career, not always followed popular opinion, Balakrishnan does not fully develop this
notion. Schmitt was notorious for always adapting his theories to popular opinion.
However, in the case of his early career, Schmitt maintains his personal ideals as
opposed to the opinions of those who could advance his career further in a more
expedient manner. He embraces some opinions that would hold very little weight in
terms of career advancement. Although this independence did not last long in the
future for Schmitt and his public opinions, it is a minor exception to a rule that many
critics of Schmitt are quick to point out.
Much of Schmitt’s early professional years were spent focusing on his legal
studies. Although he did allocate some of his efforts to his personal legal and political
theories, his most influential, and what would become his most controversial works,
were composed after the conclusion of World War I during the Weimar Republic. Many
of his most renowned works revolve around ideals of sovereignty and centralized
governmental power.
In 1933 Schmitt became a Professor of Law at the University of Berlin, a position
he held until 1945. Also in 1933, Hermann Goering appointed Schmitt the “Prussian

14
15

Ibid., 16.
Ibid.
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State Counselor.” He was also elected president of the Union of National-Socialist
Jurists in November of the same year. It is easy to see the importance of Schmitt for
the Nazis simply by looking at the numerous prominent positions that he held. In
addition to these positions, Schmitt was also a prominent advisor to several leading
politicians.
There are two primary criticisms that are commonly leveled against Carl Schmitt.
The first is the simple fact that he became a leading political theorist for the National
Socialist regime when they ascended to power. The motivation behind this criticism is
the thought that it is difficult to put much importance on a political theorist who defended
the indefensible. The second and for our concerns here more pertinent criticism is the
notion that Schmitt continuously adapted and manipulated his legal and political
theories to adhere to the ideologies of those who were in power at the time; that he
would change his own personal ideologies to suit those in power in order to advance his
legal and political career.
A common criticism made in regard to the entire spectrum of Schmitt’s career is
that he was not a true political theorist; that he simply adapted his theories in order to
appease those who were in power at any given time. Thus, Schmitt’s theories and
works appear to fluctuate throughout his entire life. Although this may have been true of
the works during his “Nazi Experience,”16 as Joseph Bendersky refers to it as, some of
his earlier works can be examined and interpreted in the opposite way. For example, in
1923 Schmitt composed an essay entitled The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy,

16

Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1983).
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which essentially condemned the political principles that had guided Germany in
establishing the Weimar Constitution.
Although Carl Schmitt is commonly portrayed as a Nazi apologist who adapted
his political theories as a reaction to events which were taking place in front of his eyes,
there is much more to his writings. Also, Schmitt is commonly criticized for the apparent
discontinuity of his works. Again, this statement might be true in some instances, but in
other instances it can be regarded as shortsighted. True, in the overall trajectory of his
career there are many areas in which his theories are constantly fluctuating, but there
are a small number of ideas which remain relatively constant in his works throughout his
life.
In order to study the career of Carl Schmitt in a comprehensive manner, it is
important to keep certain essential facts in mind. Due to the extreme amount of
fluctuation in his theories, the most important criterion to always retain is context. The
time and events which were occurring during the composition of his works are pertinent
for the correct analysis of his works. The second theme that must be addressed is the
manner in which Schmitt’s writing should be approached. As this study is more than a
biographical sketch of Carl Schmitt, the examination would not be fulfilled with a general
analysis of the texts. Rather, in order to sufficiently detail his arguments, one must
separate his works in a chronological fashion, again making sure to always retain and
compare his views of a certain time period to the context of the socio-economic climate
of that corresponding time period. The three chronological phases most salient for this
examination are: the period before and during World War I, the Weimar Republic, and
finally the National Socialist Regime.

19

Early Writings

Although the great majority of Carl Schmitt’s theories and works were composed
after the First World War, there should be brief mention of his political theories before
the war. They may not have played a pivotal role in the grand scheme of his career, but
Schmitt’s earliest intellectual works are still of interest as they provide the first indication
of the ambiguous commitments which become much more apparent throughout the
remainder of his career.
The majority of Schmitt’s earliest works were comprised of critiques of what was
the dominant legal theory of the time: “legal positivism.” The main premise of the theory
of legal positivism is two-fold. First, legal positivism states that laws are rules which are
generated by human beings, and no other entity. Secondly, this theory supposes that
legal procedure has no direct or indirect connections with human ethics or human
morality. Legal positivism is a judicial theory which completely disregards any notion of
“natural-rights.” As Lars Vinx puts it, “the fact that a policy would be just, wise, efficient,
or prudent is never sufficient reason for thinking that it is actually the law, and the fact
that it is unjust, unwise, inefficient or imprudent is never sufficient reason for doubting
it.”17
The very first of Schmitt’s writings before and during the First World War were
scholarly in nature. The first of his writings was his dissertation entitled Über Schuld
und Schuldarten (“On Guilt and Degrees of Guilt”). In this dissertation, Schmitt’s
primary objective was to examine the specific moment in which a judge makes a
17

Lars Vinx, "Carl Schmitt", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/schmitt/>. [accessed May 14,
2013].
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decision in a legal case. He argues that this precise moment is extremely inefficient
and is a “free-floating element in the legal process.”18 Schmitt soon complemented his
dissertation with another discourse entitled Gesetz und Urteil (“Statute and Judgment”).
This work too, which was an extension of his dissertation, focused on the precise
moment when the judge makes his decision. Schmitt concluded that the legal norm is
extremely inefficient. He argues that the legal norm is “entirely embedded in the
ultimately arbitrary conventions of interpretation within the legal community.”19 Schmitt,
in this text, appears to be entirely disgusted with the manner in which judicial decisions
are made, and possibly even more so, how they are generally “proven.” He indicates
that “a judicial decision is now correct when it can be assumed that another judge would
have come to the same judgment.”20 Schmitt emphasizes that legal positivism
disregards any notion of natural law. He states that, in practice, legal positivism does
not presuppose any sort of inherent law of humanity; specifically, it does not reserve
any possibility for morality or reason. Schmitt, at this time, criticizes legal positivism
believing that, if enforced correctly, it essentially eliminates reason, asserting that every
person is accountable for their actions regardless of situation or alternate choices,
whether it would have concluded more positively or negatively.
These two discourses which Schmitt composed before the First World War
portray political views which are, as many historians are quick to indicate, very different
from his post-war political theories. Some of the basic principles he defends in these
early writings are opposed to the arguments which he makes in the Weimar writings. In
these scholarly discussions Schmitt contends that interpretations in the legal community
18
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are incorrect, vague, and inefficient. He argues that the system in place needs to be
recalibrated in order to become more effective. Many of his writings during the Weimar
period in Germany have a considerably different tenor to them. Implied in these early
writings, Schmitt appears to favor natural law, arguing that without accounting for
morality, reasoning, and rationality. Later writings, as will now be discussed, will imply a
total rejection of Universalist natural law theory.

Weimar Writings

Although many of his earliest works are fairly inconsequential in the grand
scheme of his entire career the choices that Carl Schmitt made in his university years to
pursue an education in jurisprudence followed him throughout his career. As has been
previously noted, Schmitt, during the outbreak of the First World War, did not display the
same amount of enthusiastic nationalism as did most of his German counterparts. With
the arrival of the news of the armistice and the Treaty of Versailles, Schmitt then began
to compose a series of some of the most significant political writings of the Weimar
Republic.
In two of the first major works that Schmitt composed, he examines several
issues such as sovereignty, the order of the state, and the question concerning
leadership. These works in question are The Dictator, written in 1921, and Political
Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, written in 1922.21 The Dictator
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was his examination of the historical meaning and use of dictatorship throughout the
world. Schmitt delves back to the original idea of dictatorship, that of Rome. Dictatorial
power in Rome was used for the protection of the current form of government. The
primary premise which Schmitt tends to emphasize throughout his work is that
dictatorial power is not usually sovereign. With the addition of the term “sovereign,” it is
important to define what Schmitt truly identifies as “sovereign.” He firmly believes that
as long as governance is exercised with the will of the people in mind, a dictator would
in fact be a sovereign dictator. The entirety of Schmitt’s historiographical approach to
the idiom “sovereign dictator” is intended to illustrate the development of basic
emergency powers which the state should maintain in a suitable democracy. This
calling for a “sovereign dictator” is consistently hinted at in many of his earliest works,
but The Dictator is where this ideal is fully developed. This ideal becomes the keystone
of Schmitt’s call for a populist dictatorship later in his career.
Many of the historical instances which Schmitt discusses involve revolutions.
The primary reason that Schmitt discusses these revolutions is because emergency
powers were called upon. Most integral for him was the French Revolution. The reason
he places so much emphasis on the French Revolution is because Schmitt sees in it the
first glimpse of a “sovereign dictatorship.” What makes the French Revolution so
important to his discourse is the fact that dictatorial powers were called upon and, most
importantly, were used in order to transform the primary system of government in the
name of, and by the will of, the people. Schmitt noted the efforts of Jacobinism during
the French Revolution. The mentality of “fighting for the good of the general will” that
was displayed, according to Schmitt would ideally translate to the populist movement
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during Weimar, ideally leading to a populist and sovereign dictator.22 For Schmitt, The
Dictator, although it stresses the impact of the French Revolution, presents a
comparable situation to that of Weimar. A sovereign dictator, in the name of the people,
is the perfect solution for the instability of the Weimar Republic.
Another integral facet of Schmitt’s discourse on dictatorship is the fact that he
views this “sovereign dictatorship” as being essentially a democratic institution since the
dictatorial emergency powers are designed with only the true will of the people in mind.
Schmitt argues that the term dictator should not be regarded as complete and
permanent authority given to a single individual, and that any dictatorial emergency
decree must only be made with the will of the people in mind.
In his 1921 work entitled The Concept of the Political, Schmitt analyzes the term
politics, the political, and the state. Schmitt begins this text by comparing the ideas of
the state and of the political. As he puts it, “the concept of the state presupposes the
concept of the political.”23 What is crucial here for Schmitt is that the political is not
equivalent to the concept of the state. He then details the difference between the
concept of the political and the concept of party politics. The primary difference that he
maintains is that the political is a component of human nature rather than a component
of the state which is where he locates party politics. Schmitt then devotes the
remainder of the text to his primary thesis of the friend-enemy distinction as the basis of
politics.
The friend-enemy thesis, on which Schmitt focuses the bulk of his attention in
this text, states that, in the political realm, there must be a series of friends and enemies
22
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in order for there to be a concept of the political. He begins this argument by stating
that “friend,” and more specifically, “enemy,” are, in essence, political terms. An
extremely important argument that Schmitt states here is that political enemies are not
individuals, but rather belong to a group. He expands his theory of the political enemy
by stating that, “the enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict
in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only
when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar
collectivity.”24 Schmitt also describes the enemy as necessary in order for the political
and, to a larger extent, the state to become legitimate. He continues the defense of his
theory by stating that a political enemy of a state would not necessarily be the enemy of
the state forever.
The primary theme in this work, which could easily be seen as foreshadowing of
Carl Schmitt’s future career development, is the differences between the friends of
political groups and the enemies of political groups. Schmitt makes certain not to
delineate specific political groups, but he does outline proper actions to take in the case
of political enmity. Throughout much of his text he illuminates and suggests that war
against political enemies is not only acceptable, but it is necessary in order to provide
homogeneity in the nation or state. In the mind of Schmitt, the state is the most
important institution in the nation; the state is practically omnipotent in its reign, and is
regulated solely by the people which put it in power. Echoing sentiments Hobbes
relayed in Leviathan,25 Schmitt even goes so far to declare that:
The state as the decisive political entity possesses an enormous power; the
possibility of waging war and thereby publicly disposing of the lives of men…as
24
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long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it
in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy.26
Although it is fairly easy to see the significance of this quote in light of Schmitt’s later
personal involvement in the National Socialist state, it also illustrates his defense of
state power more generally. Throughout The Concept of the Political he attempts to
justify any action the state could take; whether it is against other states, other political
organizations, or against anyone, or anything, that could be considered a “real enemy”
for any reason. He states that “the justification of war does not reside in its being fought
for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy.”27 Implicit in
this quote is the complete rejection of not only international law, but also universalist
norms including human rights.
Another major argument in The Concept of the Political is Schmitt’s ongoing
polemic against the ideals and institutions of liberalism. He declares that true liberalism
attempts to begin the process of “depoliticalization.”28 He believes that true political
belief systems lose the entire worth of their existence if the presence of a central state
rests on the compromises of friendly deliberation and litigation. If these attributes of
liberalism actually guided any nation, it would, according to Schmitt, effectively lead to
the lack of any political organization due to the absence of political differences which
create the friend-enemy debate. Thus, with no political differences, there would be no
real politics and – recollecting his original statement in The Concept of the Political that
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“the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political,”29– there would, in
effect, be no state at all.
Schmitt also stakes out a position concerning the possibility of universalism; he
argues that true universalism is not actually attainable. For evidence, he looks at the
League of Nations which was created after World War I. He states that the League of
Nations would not be able to make collective political ideals due to the fact that, inside
of the League of Nations, every state would still be recognized individually. Schmitt is
able to connect this argument to his friend-enemy thesis by discussing how, in such a
group, there is still certain to be outcasts, and at the very least there will be dissent over
ideas and topics. He is able to connect his theories on universalism to his position on
humanism as well. He was also a critic of humanistic beliefs. Humanity, in Schmitt’s
views, cannot even wage war. Humanity consists of all human beings. In this sense,
humanity has no one to wage war against; there is no other party for the collective
humanity to declare war upon. Schmitt believes that humanity corresponds to
universalism in the very strong sense that it assumes equality for all. He states that
universalism of any sort would assume that there were no states. Schmitt affirms this
theory by stating, “universality at any price would necessarily have to mean the
depoliticalization and with it, particularly, the nonexistence of states.”30
Schmitt’s greatest fear is the lack or nonexistence of a political system, which
would, in turn suggest the lack or nonexistence of the state. In his discourse he states
that liberalism and/or the Kantian idea of a global republican government would destroy
both the political system and the state. Schmitt declares:
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It would be a mistake to believe that a nation could eliminate the distinction of
friend and enemy by declaring its friendship for the entire world or by voluntarily
disarming itself. The world will not thereby become depoliticalized, and it will not
be transplanted into a condition of pure morality, pure justice, or pure economics.
If a people is afraid of the trials and risks implied by existing in the sphere of
politics, then another people will appear which will assume these trials by
protecting it against foreign enemies and thereby taking over political rule.31
What Schmitt is stating is the fact that, if a certain group of people have no interest in
the traumas of politics, and if they decide to take the liberal/universal route of
renouncing their political ideals, there will certainly be a separate group that will be more
than willing to take control of the area and instill their own personal political ideals. This
would effectively make the original group, which renounced their political participation,
subject to the “protector…who decides who the enemy is.”32
In his 1922 discourse entitled Political Theology Schmitt further develops his
theories regarding sovereignty and dictatorship. In this text he argues that an individual
authority must be present in order to dictate and guard legal norms of the state. He
argues that in a state in which there is a large legislative system, much of the legal
precedents can be lost through the processes of translation and interpretation. Schmitt
declares that, in order for the legal system to hold true to its standards, a single
authority must be present. With an authority, the legal norms would be upheld with
much more confidence and consistency. He sees a basic problem with the way in
which the legal system is upheld. The system, as Schmitt understands it, is only as
efficient as the case is clear. In cases with specific and particular scenarios and
evidence, he believes that there must be a sovereign authority who can properly
interpret the legal code in terms of how it may pertain to the case at hand. Schmitt here
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is only concerned with material law; he does not consider the role of emotion, morality,
or mental state as he believes that politics and jurisprudence should not be concerned
with matters of this nature.
Another concern of importance, according to Schmitt, is the fact that the legal
system requires a “homogenous medium.”33 By this he is referring to the idea that
normal legal codes prove to be ineffective in a political, economic, and social state of
disarray. He declares that no normal legal code can control a state in an emergency.
He believes that the only person that can overcome a state in total emergency is “the
sovereign.”34
One of, if not the most important target of Schmitt’s criticisms was the institution
of parliamentary democracy. In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Carl Schmitt
condemns the fundamental ideals upon which parliamentary democracy is based. In
order to truly understand the arguments made by Schmitt in this critique one must
understand what in fact he is actually criticizing. In the mind of Schmitt, democracy is
understood as being a government which is ruled for and, more importantly, by the
people. With this idea at the forefront for Schmitt, one can examine his critique in
further detail.
Democracy is a very fragile institution for Schmitt. He believes that, in order for
this institution to complete its duty in a way that satisfies its defining characteristics, it is
necessary for the people to be in control of the government. With the addition of the
representative parliament, Schmitt believes that this condition will never be satisfied.
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He believes rather that parliament destroys what it is designed to accomplish. There
are a variety of reasons for this belief which he elaborates in this critique.
The main reason he proclaims why the institution of parliament inhibits the ideals
of democracy is the fact that there is a series of compromises throughout the
deliberation processes that occur in parliament. With compromises come the fact that
people will not get exactly what they are aiming for; the people are being forced to
concede a portion of their desires. He declares early on in his treatise:
Destroying almost every hope…parliamentarism has already produced a
situation in which all public business has become an object of spoils and
compromise for the parties and their followers, and politics, far from being the
concern of an elite, has become the despised business of a rather dubious class
of persons.35
Although it is not realistic for every individual to achieve all of his or her desires, Schmitt
believes that this is a failure of parliament to fulfill its duties.
Arguably one of the most disturbing arguments Schmitt makes in his critique is
the idea of the majority and the “General Will.” He states:
In democracy the citizen even agrees to the law that is against his own will, for
the law is the General Will and, in turn, the will of the free citizen. Thus a citizen
never really gives his consent to a specific content but rather in abstracto to the
result that evolves out of the general will and he votes only so that the votes out
of which one can know this general will can be calculated. If the result deviates
from the intention of those individuals voting, then the outvoted know that they
have mistaken the content of the general will.36
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Echoing the thoughts in Rousseau’s The Social Contract,37 Schmitt is effectively arguing
in this instance that the essence of democracy states that only the people who vote on
the victorious side of the issue are correct in terms of what the general will comprises.
The people who voted for the opposition were mistaken when they were voting, and that
the victorious option was what they truly desired: again reiterating Rousseau who
argued that dissenters must be “forced to be free!”38 Schmitt is obviously criticizing the
ideals of parliamentary democracy in this excerpt insofar as it entails the protection of
minority opinions and rights.
Schmitt also states in his critique that the people are not necessarily being
represented in parliament in a sufficient manner. He accuses democratic
representatives in parliament of having their own personal agendas which they pursue
during deliberation instead of the desires of those who they are supposedly
representing. “Democracy seems fated then to destroy itself in the problem of the
formation of a will.”39 He believes that in the true spirit of democracy, the
representatives, have the problem of choosing whether to fight for the will of the majority
or for the will of themselves. In this case these parliamentary representatives have the
ability to transform their own personal will into the general will of the people.
Schmitt states that “the minority might express the true will of the people; the
people can be deceived, and one has long been familiar with the techniques of
propaganda and the manipulation of public opinion.”40 This “ancient dialectic in the
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theory of the will of the people”41 is another area in which Carl Schmitt believes
parliamentary democracy is faulty. This adage maintains the idea that just because
there is a majority vote it does not necessarily correlate into it being the proper ideal for
the general will. Due to outstanding public and external factors, the will of the majority
can be misrepresented and misconstrued. The majority can be, in the words of Schmitt,
“manipulated” and “deceived” by the hands of propaganda.
Throughout his entire discourse on the topic of parliamentary democracy, Schmitt
argues that the principles, upon which this institution is based, are nothing but an
“idealistic belief”42 that is no longer sufficient to complete the objectives it was
constructed to accomplish. His argument that parliamentary democracy is anachronistic
is based on his thought that “today…the masses are won over through a propaganda
apparatus whose maximum effect relies on an appeal to immediate interests and
passions.”43 Schmitt argues that the parliament is outdated due to the fact that “political
elite”44 no longer have the interests of the “general will” in mind, but rather their
individual will.
Although it may appear in this treatise that Schmitt does not believe in the values
instilled in democracy, he is simply critiquing the institution of liberal parliamentarism.
He aims to separate democracy from liberalism in order to create an authoritarian
populist state. By separating and defining liberalism and democracy, he is able to
weaken the fundamental principles of both. Concerning liberalism he declares that,
being originally liberal in thought, parliament’s deficiencies are essentially unequivocal
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because it has run its course. Concerning democracy, Schmitt argues that it is
incapable of being sustained due to, what he views as the essential issue within
democracy, equality. He maintains in this text that “every actual democracy rests on the
principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally.
Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and secondly—if the need arises—
elimination or eradication of heterogeneity:”45 a declaration that may foreshadow the
direction which Schmitt’s career advances in the 1930s.46
In another major theoretical discourse, Constitutional Theory,47 Schmitt applies
his primary political theories to the Weimar Republic. In this discourse he argues that
constitutional change is unacceptable due to the manner in which the Weimar
Constitution was composed. He argues that since the constitution was composed after
the German Revolution of 1918 by a politically united people, the initial decrees that
were included in the constitution are acceptable. The problem that Schmitt perceives is
the secondary decrees, or the decrees which the representatives incorporated into the
constitution. As it usually does, the role of the popular sovereign plays a major role, in
Schmitt’s understanding, in the composition of a constitution. He argues that, due to the
fact that not all of the constitutional decrees were composed and agreed to by the
popular sovereign, amending these different decrees must be done in various
manners.48 Due to the fact that not all of the constitutional decrees were included in the
same fashion by the same people, they are not inherently equal. Thus, they must have
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a varying ease of modification or amendment. The conclusion which Schmitt attains
returns to the sovereign dictator he had outlined earlier in The Dictator. He argues that
only a sovereign dictator possesses the ability to legitimately amend constitutional
decrees in the name of the popular sovereign. According to Schmitt, not only can a
sovereign dictator challenge the current constitutional decrees, but also, if the popular
sovereign fears a coup by a tyrannical representative group. As a result, as Lars Vinx
writes, “the German people, in a renewed exercise of their constituent power, might
legitimately choose a non-liberal and non-parliamentarian form of democracy.”49
As critical as Schmitt is of liberalism, he actually defends it, in a sort of
ambiguous manner, when he states that as long as the state is able to secure
individuals’ constitutional freedoms in a proper fashion, liberalism would be acceptable
for a short period of time. Of course, the only acceptable means by which this security
would be maintained would be the President of the Weimar Republic and the institution
of the infamous Article 48 of the constitution. Since liberal rights were fundamental to
the Weimar Constitution, Schmitt believed that those rights would have to be respected
and protected –though there was an important exception. This exception was that of
the sovereign. He argued that, as long as it was done in the name of the people, a
sovereign decision could suspend and amend any section of the constitution and
political state that would be considered necessary.50
Although Carl Schmitt has been repeatedly accused of constantly changing his
views, his writings during the Weimar Republic seem to consistently argue several
similar points. A sharp and consistent critique of liberalism can be found in the majority
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of his texts during this time. The overarching theme in a number of his texts is that
liberalism is an attempt to universalize the state, to take popular sovereignty out of the
political equation, and even to rid the state of politics all together. In terms of his
understanding of the role of liberalism, Schmitt believes that it essentially destroys the
principles which it was instituted to defend. Democracy, as Schmitt understands it, is a
political institution which is designed to implement the will of the people. Liberalism, as
he repeatedly notes in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, effectively disregards
the will of the people in favor of the will of those who were supposedly chosen to
represent the will of those people and special interest groups. Not only is there a
likelihood that the representatives will choose for what is better for them than for the
betterment of the people as a whole; liberal democracy also destroys the basic ideal of
the people being sovereign.
As he makes clear in several of his writings during the Weimar period, Schmitt
was also an advocate of a sovereign dictator. In his discourse on the history and role of
dictators, Schmitt was sure to define the specific sort of dictatorship which would be
politically defensible for the state. In Die Diktatur, Schmitt outlines a blueprint of what a
proper dictator should be, and the correct situation in which a dictator would be useful,
and even necessary. He also continues to allude to the idea of a dictator, specifically a
dictator that would declare an authoritarian populist state; in other works, such as
Political Theology, he discusses the necessary role of a sovereign authority.51 He also
states that a dictatorship is essential in his discussion of liberalism in The Crisis of
Parliamentary Democracy when he examines the issue of how disconnected the
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institutions of liberalism are with the guiding ideals of democratic politics. He states that
a sovereign dictatorship is in much closer relation to democracy than that of liberalism.52
Another continuity which is apparent from a variety of Schmitt’s Weimar writings
is the role of homogeneity. Although it does not appear in as strong a manner as the
other primary components of Schmitt’s arguments, the ideal of homogeneity is still
present. Although Schmitt argues in The Concept of the Political that there is a
necessity for political differences, he describes how the end result should conclude with
a sovereign authority who maintains the power to decide “upon the domestic enemy,”53
and who is also capable in deciding in—“if the need arises—elimination or eradication of
heterogeneity.”54
Easily the most formative period of Carl Schmitt’s career and theories, the
Weimar period witnessed a plethora of new political ideas. He was among the theorists
who expounded on how a true democracy should be comprised. Central to many of his
arguments is his description of democracy. Schmitt has a very specific definition of
democracy, and what it entails. In The Dictator he details what his definition is. He
believes that a democratic constitution is one voted by the popular majority. The
argument that he makes is that a democratic government must maintain an executive,
“sovereign” body, capable of making decisions. This, whether it is a president, or any
other “head of state,” according to Schmitt, must also maintain the power to declare a
“state of emergency,” or as Schmitt defines it, a “state of exception.”55 Schmitt identifies
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this as being essentially dictatorial.56 This consistent support of “democracy” is a
primary argument that he later points to in order to prove his support for Weimar and
refute claims that he had supported the Nazis earlier.

The Nazi

Carl Schmitt’s career during the 1930s is the period that provides critics with the
most ammunition. This period of his career is by far the most controversial. When
Adolf Hitler ascended to power in 1933, Schmitt elected to amend his political
allegiances in favor of National Socialism. This decision has plagued the entirety of his
career, for obvious reasons. Schmitt became a leading political advisor to the Nazi
party during the majority of their reign. He was given a number of political promotions,
and held high-ranking positions of political importance, such as when Herman Goering
promoted him as Prussian State Counselor. Not only was he a political advisor to the
Nazi party, he was also a leading academic professor in the field of law and
jurisprudence at the University of Berlin. He was even elected as president of the Union
of National-Socialist Jurists. The year 1933 proved to be an extremely successful year
for the personal career advancement of Carl Schmitt.
In order to coherently explore the career development of Schmitt after the
National Socialist reign in Germany, it is important to examine the choices that Schmitt
made, and the reasons for those choices. Leading up to the Nazi rise to power, he
suggested that he was an advocate of the Weimar Republic, though it was mostly due
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to the emergency powers that were entitled in the constitution. In the latter writings he
composed during the Weimar period, most notably his Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, he strongly criticized the Weimar system. The system, due to the drastic
fluctuation of the economy—especially with the 1929 World Economic Crisis—was
rapidly losing public support. With this major point in the mind of Schmitt, many of his
critics argued that shifting his support towards the Nazi regime was simply a ploy in
order for the opportunistic Schmitt to further develop his career. Although it is difficult to
argue that these critics are incorrect, with all of the accolades he received shortly after
amending his support, it can also be argued that this does not accurately represent the
entire situation.
In many of his primary discourses throughout the Weimar period he presents a
strong critique liberalism and the representational system of constitutional drafting; the
essence of Weimar. One of the only premises which Schmitt applauds from Weimar is
that it was created by the people through the course of the 1918 revolution. When
comparing many of his political theories to National Socialism, there seems to be a
greater amount of similarities. Gopal Balikrishnan states of Schmitt during the early
section of 1933 that:
After a few months of caution in 1933, it dawned on him that National Socialism
in power represented the unexpected, even perverse resolution of what he had
earlier identified as the main problems of political order in age of mass politics.
This conviction was the basis of his relationship to National Socialism, even
when one allows for the role which naked ambition and opportunism played in his
decision to cleave to the new order.57
Another item that may have played into the decision which Schmitt ultimately made in
shifting his political affinities to support National Socialism was self-preservation. This is
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another area which Balakrishnan describes. Balakrishnan alludes to the idea that, in
order for Schmitt to remain in German society, especially political society, he essentially
had no decision to make. Although this may be the case, it is also apparent that this
was not the entire case either; no one with the mantra that they simply did not want to
be outcast due to their political affinities would soon become referred to as the “’Crown
Jurist’ of National Socialism.”58
During his affiliation with National Socialism Schmitt devoted the majority of his
efforts to educating the youths at the University level, as well as defending the events
which Hitler and the Nazi regime were propagating. He occasionally published articles
and texts which were designed to support the wrongdoings of the regime such as the
Nazis’ killings of political opponents59 and their usurpation of power in order to create a
more centralized government headed by Hitler. These writings and texts are commonly
used in the critiques of Schmitt for obvious reasons; he was effectively defending the
indefensible.
Much of Schmitt’s time and efforts during his Nazi period were concerned with
defending the acts of Hitler and Nazi leaders. Many of these consist of the murders of
Nazi political opponents.60 Schmitt was able to defend these killings by arguing that
“the government can exempt itself from judicial review when it must ‘defend society
against enemies, inside, outside, open, concealed, present, and future.’”61 This
statement parallels his earlier notions made in The Dictator and The Crisis of
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Parliamentary Democracy where he argued that emergency powers are necessary for a
successful form of government.
National Socialism eventually became disillusioned with Schmitt and his politics.
Balakrishnan credits this disillusionment to Schmitt’s political colleagues.62 Many of
these former colleagues criticized Schmitt for his Catholic ideals, Jewish contacts, and
fervent opportunism. Nazi investigators began probing the devotion of Schmitt to
Nazism, and Nazi leadership. Goering soon called off the investigation citing his
personal trust. Goering stated, “Without wanting to take a position on the factual
accusations which are in themselves not unjustified, I must emphatically state that it is
not acceptable for well-known personalities, who have been called to high public office
through my trust, to be defamed in this way.”63 During the latter years of Schmitt’s Nazi
period, he dealt less with Nazi jurisprudence, and focused the majority of his time on
questions involved with international law.
Although there are critics and sympathizers of Carl Schmitt due to his support of
the Nazis after their takeover of Germany in 1933, no one argument is truly sound. An
examination of his Weimar work makes clear that it is highly unlikely that Schmitt made
his decision solely in a fit of opportunism. There is also the argument, although not as
strong as the others, that the decision had something to do with self-preservation.
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Looking Back

Carl Schmitt is a highly controversial political figure. The reason behind this is
primarily due to the decision he made in the early 1930s to support the National
Socialists. Many historians are quick to criticize the decision he made based on the
argument that he compromised his principal political theories in order to advance his
political and professional career.
Throughout his works, there is a plethora of evidence that supports the argument
that Schmitt did not have to critically amend many of the primary principles of his
theories. When examining his discourses, especially those from the Weimar years, it is
exceedingly difficult to determine whether Schmitt is criticizing the Weimar Constitution
or supporting it. Although he “openly” declares that he was an advocate of the Weimar
system in his latter works, it is difficult, especially in his early works to discern whether
he supports the political system.
The principles guiding the Weimar system were a representative democracy
based on liberal principles. These are the basic principles of what Weimar was
instituted to represent, on behalf of the people. These principles are essentially the
same that Schmitt condemned in the vast majority of his Weimar discourses. Some of
his criticisms are more candid than others, but the majority of his discussions
concerning liberalism and representative democracy culminate in a strong criticism of
the doctrines as a whole.
Several of his texts focus on these Weimar principles. In The Dictator, The
Concept of the Political, and The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy he states what he

41

believes are the primary problems with the doctrines in the Weimar Constitution;
specifically with the ideals of liberalism and of representative democracy. In The
Dictator, Schmitt applies the foundations for many of his works that were soon to follow.
He declares how there is a great necessity for a strong central government; more
specifically a dictator, and a dictator who is placed into power on behalf of the people to
be exact. This supposed necessity of a strong central government was not represented
anywhere in the Weimar Constitution.
In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy Schmitt continues his assault upon
what could be seen as the institution of the Weimar Constitution. In this text Schmitt
sets out in hopes of undermining the basic principles instituted in liberal democracy as a
governmental establishment. He declares that a government founded with these values
will not be sufficient in providing for the safety and welfare of the people it governs over.
The majority of this text emphasizes the objections Schmitt has to basic principles of
liberal democracy and, specifically, of parliament. Schmitt views parliament as an
unproductive tool which is not effective in making adequate and efficient decisions
based on the general will of “the people.” In attacking the parliament, Schmitt is
effectively attacking one of the main institutions used in the drafting of the Weimar
Constitution. While the constitution was being drafted, the parliament was in control of
deliberating different options and ideals that could be incorporated into the constitution.
If Schmitt’s theories are taken directly as he composed them in The Crisis of
Parliamentary Democracy, it can easily be deduced that the manner in which the
Weimar Constitution was constructed was simply inappropriate.
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Schmitt’s assault on the institution of parliament is also analogous to the Nazi
reign in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s. The very idea of parliamentary discussion
during the reign of Hitler was suppressed. He had only a small number of close
advisors who would counsel him in major decisions. This, in combination with the
“sovereign dictator” idiom which Schmitt writes about, is a clear parallel to the reign of
Hitler and the National Socialists.
When looking at the theories that Schmitt composed during Weimar Germany,
one could find it difficult to relate them to the ideals instilled in the conception and the
implementation of the Weimar Constitution. The Weimar Constitution was based upon
the liberal ideal there the people were represented by many different parties in a
parliamentary style republic. These very ideals were opposed vehemently by Schmitt in
the majority of his texts during the Weimar Republic. Very little, if any, liberal thought or
liberal sympathies can be found when analyzing his writings. In fact, the majority of his
writings are in strict opposition to liberal thought. Schmitt argues that there should be a
dictator that exercises power, in the name of the people, and that the dictator should
rule in a very strong manner.
After considering everything, it is very easy to see the many parallels between
the theories of Carl Schmitt and the ideals of National Socialism. The gray area
between his theories and the ideals instilled by the Weimar Constitution become more
distinctive. Schmitt’s alleged support for the Weimar Constitution is greatly
exaggerated. Although many scholars believe and declare that Schmitt greatly skewed
his Weimar theories to adapt them to the ideals of the National Socialists, upon further
review it appears that his views could have been adapted to the ideals of the National
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Socialists rather easily. When taking the Weimar Constitution, and comparing it sideby-side to National Socialism and Hitler’s reign in the 1930s and 1940s, Schmitt’s
theories are much closer in relation to the latter. The basic premises involved in
National Socialism are shared by the theories composed by Schmitt during Weimar.
Both idealize a strong centralized government that is realized by way of a populist
“sovereign dictator.”
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CHAPTER 3

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

A Biographical Glimpse

Martin Heidegger was born in 1889 in Meβkirch, Germany. He began his
extensive studies in the realm of theology but eventually altered his studies to the field
of mathematics and philosophy. After earning his doctoral degree and completing his
dissertation, “The Doctrine of Categories and Signification in Duns Scotus,” Heidegger
enrolled in the German Army and achieved rather quick success, being promoted from
private to the rank of corporal within ten months.64 Although he had some early success
during his stint in the armed forces, Heidegger was discharged from the German Army
due to health concerns.65 He then began to focus on a new profession: teaching and
lecturing at the university level. His first major professorial position was at the
University of Freiburg where he became a lecturer of philosophy. Later, Heidegger took
a position of associate professor at the University of Marburg in 1924.66 These were the
years when he wrote Being and Time, 67 the philosophical work that would prove to be
the most influential, as well as most controversial, of his career, even though he was
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pressured to finish before it was truly completed. Heidegger claimed that the work
represented only one-third of the final masterpiece he was ultimately planning.68
Heidegger would continue to hold his position of professor and also continue
delivering his lectures at the University of Marburg until 1928 when he elected to accept
a professorial position at the University of Freiburg. The year 1933 posed a very
important professional achievement as well as a very big political decision for
Heidegger. In 1933 he was elected Rector of the University of Freiburg. This was also
the year when he officially joined the National Socialist Party. These two milestones for
Heidegger are most certainly related to one another. He held his position at the
University of Freiburg until 1934,69 when he resigned because of disputes with several
faculty members and local Nazi political officials.70 Although he resigned as Rector due
to the differences in opinion with Nazi administrators, Heidegger remained a member of
the National Socialist Party until 1945.71
Due to his influence and importance as a philosopher and his involvement in the
Nazi Party, Heidegger is a highly controversial figure. To make matters worse in terms
of controversy, he refused to apologize for his involvement even after receiving such
advice from Herbert Marcuse.72 During the denazification process, Heidegger was
banned from lecturing at the university level, essentially ending his professorial career.
He was also denied emeritus status for a period of time, although he was ultimately
awarded the status. Heidegger suffered a nervous breakdown in 1946, but continued to
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compose speeches and write. Although he continued to write and speak, his most
important, influential, and controversial pieces remain those he wrote from the late
1920s and early 1930s, especially his magnum opus Being and Time. Martin
Heidegger died in Freiburg on May 26, 1976.
The life and career of Martin Heidegger is still an area of much controversy
today. Some of the more important scholarly texts composed by Victor Farias, Richard
Wolin, and Emmanuel Faye are highly critical of Heidegger, his career, his political path,
and his philosophy. These three men have similar arguments. They essentially argue
that Heidegger believed that his most important ideals had been realized with the
takeover of the National Socialist Party. Although these authors adopted varying
degrees of severity in terms of how they judged his career path, all three of them
conclude that Heidegger’s theories bore a strong correlation to the ideology of the Nazi
Party.
The philosophical theories most pertinent to the examination at hand are found in
Being and Time. As Richard Wolin suggests,73 the principal philosophical ideas in
Being and Time can also be used to examine Heidegger’s political values. In this
chapter I will take a similar approach, although the argument that is made is slightly
different. While Wolin, Faye, Johannes Fritsche and other scholars tend to argue that
Heidegger’s philosophies were realized with National Socialism, it will be argued in this
thesis that it was rather the opportunistic Heidegger that was able to adapt and
manipulate some of his ideologies in order to advance his career and personal agenda
within the growing Nazi Organization. Once in a position of power, Heidegger believed
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that he would be able to influence Nazi administrators into taking stances that were
more in line with his true philosophical ideals.74 The predominant ideas in the texts of
Martin Heidegger will provide the basis for an examination of his political beliefs and
actions.

Being, Time, and Politics

The life of Martin Heidegger has been subjected to much scrutiny and criticism.
This is due in part to his influence as a philosopher, and to the decisions he made to
join and his involvement with the National Socialist German Worker’s Party. A highly
influential philosopher and professor at both the University of Freiburg and the
University of Marburg, his career was marred by this decision. Many scholars such as
Richard Wolin, Johannes Fritsche, Michael Zimmerman, and Emmanuel Faye, assert
that many of Heidegger’s political ideals can be derived from his philosophical texts.
The most notable of these is Being and Time.
Being and Time was Heidegger’s most influential philosophical treatise. In this
text he aims to effectively examine what “Being” truly is. There are three main theories
that are integral for the understanding of this text. The primary theme and purpose of
the text is to pose the question of the meaning of Being. He desires to examine what
the essence of “Being” is. He is also determined to describe the criteria for what type of
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entity constitutes a “being.”75 The first major theme of “being” is the conception of
“being.” Heidegger argues that in order to fully grasp the meaning of “being” one needs
to conceptualize the fact that he is himself truly “being.” A true “being” needs to
therefore become fully aware of their own existence. The “being” that is able to
conceive himself as existing as a “being” is what Heidegger denotes as “Dasein.”
Dasein is the second notion that must be grasped for Heidegger. Dasein is his
attempt to state what is encompassed in “being.” He states that Dasein is not “man” but
at the same time is nothing other than “man.” According to Heidegger Dasein is the
human being that is aware of itself and its existence. This is also where he begins to
examine the concept of authenticity. According to Heidegger, authenticity was
essential. Several attributes were also necessary for authenticity to be achieved for
Heidegger. Not only does there have to be a sense of individualism, but also—as is
seen in the final two sections of Being and Time—a subordination of this group of
individuals to the collective. For Heidegger, this would ultimately result in
Schicksal(s)gemeinschaft, or the “community of destiny.” This community that
Heidegger anticipates is a community that is united in will and ideals. The notion of
authenticity for Heidegger leads to the third notion, that of time.
Time creates a problem for Heidegger in his theories. According to him, Dasein
is a being that is self-aware of its personal existence. Along with this concept comes
the idea that this Dasein is a human being. Human beings have a finite life span; that is
to say that Dasein will be born and will eventually die. Dasein to Heidegger does
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neither. According to him, Dasein is much more than just a human being, it is the
ontological category of historicity that is grounded in the individual.
Although on the surface this text does not show much similarity to National
Socialist theories, when one examines the text more carefully, there are certain parallels
between the two. As Richard Wolin states near the beginning of his critique and
examination, Heidegger never specifically states his political theories. But, Wolin
states:
In Heidegger’s case, the element of mediation is provided by his “political
philosophy’; or, more adequately expressed—since, for reasons that will later
become clear, Heidegger never articulated a political philosophy per se—by the
“political thought” through which Heidegger seeks to philosophically ground his
understanding of the world political situation.76
Wolin is stating that although Heidegger never articulates his political beliefs, they can
be inferred from his philosophical theories. Although Wolin is not the only scholar to
believe this to be true, this is the primary basis for his arguments throughout the text.
Wolin details the philosophy that is in Heidegger’s Being and Time, and demonstrates
through a thorough examination that the ideals instilled, specifically in the last two
sections of the text, are essentially the same as the tendencies realized in National
Socialism. Emmanuel Faye is another scholar that argues this point of view, though
through a certainly more aggressive critique.
Emmanuel Faye argues that Heidegger’s philosophical ideals, which are
embodied in Being and Time, have strong political parallels with National Socialism.
Though the basis of his argument is very similar to Wolin’s, Faye takes a much stronger
stance in criticizing Heidegger and his philosophy. Faye expands on the argument
76
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made by Wolin by drawing upon new lecture notes that were not available to Wolin in
his work. Between Wolin and Faye, Wolin’s work is a more credible piece of
scholarship. Although Faye’s work offers some insight, there are inaccuracies,
specifically in many of the translations. Faye is also blinded by his argument at times
which can explicitly be seen in his various arguments concerning Heidegger’s alleged
anti-Semitism.
These two scholars make numerous arguments that are very critical, but useful,
to the examination at hand. Along with other scholarly works these offer a tremendous
amount of insight into the philosophical and political theories of Martin Heidegger.
There are many incidents that anticipated the decision Heidegger would make in 1933;
there are several instances when National Socialist ideals can be discerned in his texts,
most notably Being and Time.
Though Wolin and Faye both attack the philosophies and career of Heidegger,
there are those that are more sympathetic to him. Hans Sluga is notable in this
category. In his text Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany, he
outlines Heidegger’s career, and argues that he was guilty of failed political ambitions.
Sluga attempts to persuade the reader that Heidegger strongly believed that he could
successfully steer the Nazi State in a better direction. This naive belief was fatal to the
political and professional career of Heidegger.77
In an examination of Being and Time, it is essential to separate three main
tendencies. The first division of the text is Heidegger’s argument for radical
individualization. In this argument, Heidegger discusses the way in which people need
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to be cleansed from the evils of modern technology and society. Through this cleansing
process, Heidegger argues that the people should be re-educated in the importance of
philosophy and tradition. The second tendency is the process of recovering one’s
individual self and authenticity. Heidegger states that this tendency can only be
accomplished by acknowledging and facing one’s mortality. The third tendency in Being
and Time, which is most pertinent to this examination, represents a significant change.
The final two sections of the text are where Heidegger argues for a “community of
destiny,” or the Schicksalsgemeinschaft. This concept refers to a community of people
that have already gone through the cleansing process proposed in the first section of
the text, who thus have a uniform set of values and knowledge. Thus, this group of
people would maintain the same wants and desires. Heidegger then argues that this
“community of destiny” must select a “hero” or strong leader that would guide them in
the best possible direction.78
Throughout the first sections of Being and Time Heidegger devotes his attention
to the individual. Instead of describing a specific person he refers to Dasein. He
refrains from specifying a gender of the Dasein. He does not use the terms “he” or
“she.” In the final sections of Being and Time specifically, Heidegger seems to do
everything within his power to make Dasein capable of representing a singular, multiple,
or collectivity of all society. What he is doing is essentially stripping society of any
individuality. By combining every person, a class order or struggle no longer exists. It
is effectively arguing for a sort of National Socialist ideal where there is a loss of
individuality; where every person joins together in a collective effort regardless of
individual gain. This can be seen in Section 74 of Being and Time. It is in this section
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that Dasein recognizes its fate and becomes part of the collective. Dasein can choose
to recognize its fate, obey the call, and submit to its fate.79 According to Heidegger,
Dasein could become autonomous by not missing the opportunity to become “master of
their fate.”80 For Heidegger, fate was a calling for Dasein to join the community of the
people.
In his discussions pertaining to his theory of societal “being,” Heidegger also
makes reference to another National Socialist doctrine; the Volksgemeinschaft. Closely
related to his discussions of the “self” and the “I” involved with society Heidegger argues
in his text that once the self is realized, there is a collective Gemeinschaft of the people.
As Emmanuel Faye argues in his text, “the real project of Being and Time is the will to
destroy the idea of the I in order to make room for the ‘most radical individuation’
(radikalsten Individuation), which is emphatically realized not in the individual but in the
organic indivisibility of the Gemeinschaft of the people.”81
This is another example of Faye being essentially blinded by his argument.
Though he argues his point very firmly, he overlooks one of the basic roots of
Heidegger’s personal ideals; his disdain towards the concepts of science. Heidegger
was a strong opponent of modern technology and science. The concept of biological
categories, including the concept of race, would thus be inconsequential for Heidegger.
Faye, although he mentions Heidegger’s critical stance concerning science,
demonstrates a lack of continuity in this argument. All of his “evidence” is very vague
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and as so, could easily be interpreted in a way that is completely removed from any
type of race theory.
In the final sections of Being and Time, Dasein to Martin Heidegger is the
realization and collectivity of the people as a group. The group is not any collection of
any sort of people. He believes that the collectivity of people in this group must have
certain prerequisites. These prerequisites require the members of the collection to
realize their common ties; they must know that the group is more important than the
individual. The group must also realize what their goals are, and what events need to
happen in order to make them a reality. In addition, the group must also select a “hero”
or leader that will be able to follow. This “hero” would be a strong personality who
maintains a goal of uniformity and subordination to the collective.
As Faye also argues in his text, Heidegger was an avid supporter of taking steps
towards creating a homogenous state.82 As Faye mentioned, in Being and Time
Heidegger was a firm believer that there was a culture of “inauthentic” people. Faye
asserts that in some of Heidegger’s later texts, he focuses on the idea of the
Gleichartigkeit,83 or the “extermination of the heterogeneous.”84 In addition, he also
refers to the Gleichschaltung,85 or the means of achieving the Gleichartigkeit.86 Faye
asserts, “not only that the Gleichschaltung is a political ‘bringing into line’ but that its
goal is racial ‘reconstruction’ or ‘homogeneity,’ by the exclusion of ‘non-Aryan elements
of a foreign race’ from ‘public life.’”87 What Faye finds evident is the fact that Heidegger
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called for an “extermination of the enemy” (which Faye identifies as the Jew without
much evidence from Heidegger) which the collective group of authentic people
identified.
Here again, Faye makes an error which comes with the translation and
tendentious interpretation that he uses for Gleichartigkeit. A more proper translation of
Gleichartigkeit would be “uniformity.” This change in translation quickly exposes the
inaccuracies of another of Faye’s arguments in which he puts a large amount of stock.
To make matters worse, the difference in translations makes it appear to the reader that
Faye is modifying what Heidegger wrote to appease his argument, regardless if it is
accurate or not.
Although there are many inaccuracies and faults found in Faye’s text, it is an
important piece of literature to review in a discussion concerning the role of Heidegger
and his philosophies, and the possible impact that they may have had on the growing
conservative revolutionary sentiments during Weimar Germany. Though some of his
arguments may have flaws, the point of view and interpretation Faye maintains for
Heidegger and Being and Time is important for any objective examination.
With a discussion and an investigation of Heidegger’s Being and Time, it is
imperative to at least mention the concept of decisionism. Heidegger’s decisionism is a
major point of emphasis for the arguments that Richard Wolin makes in his text. The
main aim of the text is to deduce the political thought and opinions of Martin Heidegger
solely based on Heidegger’s own writings; specifically Being and Time. This major
argument that Wolin makes deals with the governmental system that he supposes
Heidegger promotes in Being and Time. Wolin contends that Heidegger strongly
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promotes an authoritarian governmental system in Being and Time. He argues this due
to the fact that in Being and Time Heidegger is a strong proponent of decisionism. In
his work, Heidegger argues that it is much more important for the “hero” of the
community to assertively make a decision rather than to rationally justify his decision.
He continues his argument stating that a singular opinion in a decision making process
is stronger and more effective than a decision made by way of a sort of parliamentary,
liberal, deliberation. Wolin states that what Heidegger truly yearned for was “politics
grounded in a pure decision”88 and “not based on reason and discussion and not
justifying itself.”89 Heidegger appears to view decisions being made in a dictatorial
fashion as optimal decisions as they are the only “pure decisions” because they have
not been altered or amended by deliberative action.
As is documented by Karl Löwith,90 Heidegger based his support of National
Socialism on the idea of historicity. Richard Wolin asserts that it was not solely the
premise of historicity on which Heidegger based his support of National Socialism;
decisionism also played a major role in his support. Wolin States:
Freed of such bourgeois qualms, the National Socialist movement presented
itself as a plausible material “filling” for the empty vessel of authentic decision
and its categorical demand for existentiell-historical content. The summons
toward an “authentic historical destiny” enunciated in Being and Time was thus
provided with an ominously appropriate response by Germany’s National
Revolution. The latter, in effect, was viewed by Heidegger as the ontic fulfillment
of the categorical demands of “historicity”: it was Heidegger’s own choice of a
“hero,” a “destiny,” and a “community.”91
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Wolin’s thesis is based upon the theory that Nazism filled a void that existed in the
middle of Heidegger’s philosophy and was not seen as incompatible by Heidegger with
his philosophy. Whereas Faye attempts to argue that Heidegger was a major
proponent of the Nazi Regime, Wolin takes a much more realistic and convincing
approach.
The argument that Wolin begins to make, that Heidegger was using National
Socialism to fill this void he had in his philosophy in a most extreme case of
opportunism, is the argument being made in this thesis. Whereas Faye argues that
National Socialism was realized within the contents of Being and Time, it can be argued
that there were enough similarities in the text that Martin Heidegger was able to mold
his writings and philosophies into the ideals that were instilled in National Socialism.
Thus, Heidegger would be able to proclaim himself the true “philosopher king” of
National Socialism and, as Hans Sluga argued, could in turn use his power and
influence to guide Nazi leaders in the “correct” direction. This opportunism, as will be
discussed, blurred the vision of Heidegger’s beliefs and in some of the choices he made
through important times of his career.
Published in 1927, Being and Time is the major work of Martin Heidegger during
Weimar. Although it is clear that Being and Time is crucial for examining the
importance and influence of Martin Heidegger during and after World War I and the
Weimar Republic, it is not the only work that needs to be explored. What may be just as
important in this examination are the actual decisions that he made and events that took
place through this period of time.
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Beyond Being and Time

Although Being and Time is arguably the most important and influential work by
Martin Heidegger, the arguments in that work are far from being the only ones relevant
to Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism. Many of the thoughts that scholars
such as Richard Wolin and Emmanuel Faye are able to distill out of Being and Time
concerning Martin Heidegger’s political ideals are fairly well documented, but there is
much more to the National Socialist tendencies of Martin Heidegger. Throughout many
of his writings, correspondence, lectures, and speeches, there are many similarities
between Heidegger’s personal theories, and the theories propagated and promoted by
Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Party.
Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party sought a break from
liberalism and Western Civilization. The product of the modern bourgeoisie, liberalism
posed such an immense threat to the ideals of the National Socialist Party because the
primary theories that National Socialism sought to promote were “Aryan” racial
supremacy. Liberal thought maintained the ideals of discussion and deliberation with
the opinions of all coming into account when a decision was made. Although Hitler and
his propagandists might have deceived the people of Germany into believing that the
National Socialist Party had the best intentions, the only opinion that truly mattered to
the National Socialist Party was those of Adolf Hitler and some of his closest advisors.
To the National Socialists, liberal thought was something that was not part of
their master plans. With such events as the Beer Hall Putsch, it was apparent that
central power was much more pertinent for their success. As both Wolin and Faye point
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out, Heidegger was also extremely fond of the works and theories of Ernst Jϋnger, who,
as this work will elaborate upon, was a major advocate of struggle, power, and, most of
all, war. As understood by Adolf Hitler’s text Mein Kampf, a major premise of his
personal ideals, and National Socialism as a whole, was strife and struggle for power.
A similar promise that Heidegger saw in struggle was another type of decision.
He believed that if a person or group of people were to decide to engage in some type
of war or conflict, the decision must be very resolute and concrete due to the fact that
there is no ability to rescind their actions. This type of decision was something that
Heidegger idealized due to the fact that it was made without any sort of remorse or
caution; it is based simply upon instincts and core beliefs of a strong leader. As Richard
Wolin cites from Heidegger’s Rektoratsrede, Heidegger states, “all powers of the heart
and all capacities of the body must be deployed through struggle [Kampf], intensified in
struggle [Kampf], and preserved as struggle [Kampf].”92
Wolin, Faye, and others argue that Heidegger’s philosophy was realized with
National Socialism. Although this is a popular argument made by critics of Heidegger,
this is conceptually incorrect. One could argue that Heidegger’s philosophy was not
realized, but rather adapted by Heidegger in order to relate more succinctly to the
ideologies of National Socialism. In a fit of opportunism, Heidegger was hoping to claim
a position of power and importance in order to influence politics and policies which the
Nazi administration was making. As Michael Gillespie states:
[H]e was convinced that the possibility for such a revolution [(of subordinating
technology to knowledge)] existed within this movement and within this
movement alone. What was necessary to bring this revolution about was a
commitment by the positive intellectual forces in Germany to join this movement
92
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and spiritualize it from within. He saw himself playing a leading role in this
effort.93
Heidegger did become disillusioned with the Nazi organization fairly soon after he
realized that Nazi leaders had no interest in any of his personal ideas.
Heidegger was also opposed to the modernization of Germany. According to
him, modernization; specifically modern technology, and modern science, would
ultimately lead to a decreasing intellectual capacity of the people. As Michael
Zimmerman points out, Heidegger believed that modern technology would make people
lethargic, senseless, and incompetent.94 Heidegger maintained that language and
tradition that preserved a non-instrumental relationship to nature and “being” could
prove to be a strong determining factor in the success of a person or a state. He not
only preached this core ideology, he lived it, calling the Black Forest area of Germany
his home for many years; fundamentally cutting himself off from the “tortures” of modern
technological society.95
As Jeffery Herf elaborates, the Nazi Party, while claiming to reject modern,
urban, industrialized Germany, in fact flourished with the use of pro-modern and protechnological tactics.96 The anti-modern sentiments maintained by Heidegger ultimately
put him at odds with the practices of the Nazi Party. Although Heidegger maintains
such revulsion for technology and modernity, he also maintained that the use of modern
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technology would justify the results that he believed National Socialism would
accomplish, especially with himself as leading philosophical advisor to Nazi
administration. As Michael Allen Gillespie argues in his article “Martin Heidegger’s
Aristotelian National Socialism”:
Heidegger developed a vision of praxis and politics on an Aristotelian foundation
that he believed would reverse the domination of theory and technology in
modern life and put it its place the rule of practical wisdom or phronêsis that was
rooted in a historical understanding of the world and that put human beings and
human action ahead of values, ideological imperatives, and the process of
production.97
A primary argument that Gillespie makes in his article is that Heidegger first became
attracted to the National Socialist movement due to the fact that he believed that it
offered a much needed solution to the “crisis of Western Civilization.”98 Although
Heidegger eventually became disillusioned with the prospect of the Nazi movement
creating a break with Western Civilization, he believed, as Gillespie concludes, that “the
Nazi movement was bringing such a politics into being and that even when he
recognized this was not that case, he continued to believe such a politics was both
necessary and desirable, modifying only his conception of the means by which such an
end could be attained.”99
Heidegger and Carl Schmitt have ideals and theories that are extremely similar in
various ways. Although many of his arguments concerning Martin Heidegger are based
upon Heidegger’s Being and Time, Emmanuel Faye also widened his sources. Faye
also researched Heidegger’s speeches, lectures, letters and lesser known publications
and works that were never fully published or published at all. The majority of these
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speeches and publications, such as Heidegger’s Rector’s Address, entitled “The SelfAssertion of the German University,”100 suggest a similar point: that Martin Heidegger
was a very enthusiastic advocate of the National Socialist Party, and of the actions that
the party was undertaking. In his Rector’s Address, Heidegger lays out his arguments
and plans to renovate the structure of the German University system to go along with
the systematic changes occurring within the German state. Although this is a common
perspective on the subject, Emmanuel Faye argued the point more strongly than his
counterparts.
Faye is so adamant in his attacks on Heidegger that he even argues that
Heidegger should not even be considered a true philosopher due to the fact that he was
attempting to proselytize his fellow Germans into following the National Socialist Party
by justifying the theories and acts that the party was taking in the 1920s and 1930s.
Although he is very radical and unsympathetic in his position concerning Heidegger,
Faye’s work does shed some light on Heidegger before his official conversion to
National Socialism. In order to do this, Faye dissected statements made by some of
Heidegger’s closest students and followers from earlier periods. For example, Faye
notes that former students such as Gϋnther Anders and Max Mϋller note the emotions
and beliefs of Heidegger were those very similar to National Socialist tendencies far
ahead of the massive growth of the party in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Mϋller
even states that Heidegger would talk to his students about the ““relationship of the folk
[Volkstum] with nature, but also with the Youth Movement [Jugendbewegung]. He felt
an intimate closeness to the word volkisch and said he was tied ‘to the blood and the
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soil.””101 Faye also notes how another “disciple”102 of Heidegger, Hans-Georg
Gadamer, recalls Heidegger having an “’obvious sympathy’ […] ‘for the Nazi
radicalism…far earlier than 1933.’”103
The ideas of the Volk and the importance of “blood and soil” are significant facets
of National Socialism. These two terms were critical to the successes of National
Socialist propaganda during the growth and expansion of National Socialism in
Germany. What Emmanuel Faye is essentially attempting to argue in this section of his
text is that it was abundantly apparent to his students that in retrospect, Heidegger
always had National Socialist tendencies, and, at least to a certain degree, argued and
attempted to instill those theories and beliefs to his students in the late 1920s and early
1930s.
This is an area where Faye is tendentious, and where he loses much of his
credibility. In these transcripts that Faye selects, he fails to mention some of his more
notable students, such as Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse is just one of Heidegger’s former
students that have stated the complete opposite of the students that Faye includes in
his critique. Marcuse claimed that he saw no trace or foreshadowing Heidegger’s
National Socialist tendencies were apparent before 1933.104
In addition to all of these notations and accounts taken from former students,
Faye also delved into the diary of Hermann Mörchen. Mörchen, a German philosopher,
studied under Heidegger from 1925-1929 and kept in contact with him after his studies
concluded. Mörchen’s diary stated that Heidegger firmly believed that National
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Socialism was a necessary step in the evolution of the German people. Mörchen stated
that Heidegger held this belief due to the fact that he maintained that National Socialism
was the only political ideology that could successfully be in opposition to Marxism. This
notion that he held onto, Mörchen stated, was because of the head of state in a National
Socialist regime: a dictator.105
One important notion that Faye examines in his text are the actions that
Heidegger took physically. Faye did not simply discuss Heidegger’s “philosophical”
importance in his writings and speeches; he also examines the events that took place
throughout his tenure as university rector during the National Socialist reign. One of the
most important of these physical actions taken by Heidegger is that of the discussion
concerning “Gleichschaltung” or the “bringing into line” of the German people.106
Heidegger was a major player in the ideals instilled in the thought and belief of
Gleichschaltung. Heidegger played an important role for the Nazis in this regard. The
role Heidegger played was to provide a certain amount of legitimacy to the Nazi regime.
With Heidegger, whom was already one of the most prominent European philosophers
of the time, joining the National Socialist Party, it would surely draw some popular
interest due to his social, academic, and intellectual status.
Another instance where Faye loses some of his credibility is when he compares
Heidegger’s ideals to National Socialist conceptions of race. Faye puts a significant
amount of weight on his argument that anti-Semitism played a major role in Heidegger’s
political and personal ideology. He even devotes four of his nine primary sections to the
notion of race. Faye, by way of incorrect translations and distortions of Hediegger’s
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texts, argues that Heidegger maintained racial and, more specifically, anti-Semitic
prejudices throughout his career.
For Heidegger, race proves to be insignificant in his texts. Even in his magnum
opus Being and Time, he does not mention the notion of race being any sort of deciding
or divisional factor in authenticity. Also, his disgust with modern science is at odds with
Faye’s claims about alleged racial/biological based arguments. These arguments are
also at least rendered questionable by Heidegger’s many relationships with Jewish
students such as Herbert Marcuse, his teacher and dedicatee of Being and Time
Edmund Husserl, and his intimate relationship with Hannah Arendt. With all of these
factors, Faye’s arguments that are based on race are negligible at best.
A major step for his career advancement occurred when the Heidegger was
elected, by his colleagues, Rector of the University of Freiburg in April, 1933. His
colleagues believed that he would protect the university from the National Socialists.
These same colleagues were surely surprised when the opportunistic Heidegger, in his
Rektoratsrede, came out openly in strong favor of the Nazi Regime.107
Martin Heidegger played a major role in this initial goal of the Nazi
Gleichschaltung. By attaining the position of rector of the University of Freiburg,
Heidegger was effectively the head of university. He was able to approve or deny any
piece of legislation. Ironically, Heidegger officially joined the NSDAP just eleven days
after he was voted to the position by a faculty senate. Also ironic, this faculty senate
had just undergone an alteration to its members. Less than a month before the vote for
the rectorship of the University of Freiburg the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des
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Berufsbeamtentums went into effect. This “law for the reconstitution of the civil service,”
as it is translated to, effectively revoked the employment of “non-Aryan” university
professors. Although this legislation, upon Hindenburg’s insistence, offered exceptions
to Jewish veterans who fought in the First World War, in the Badenland, which included
the University of Freiburg, another legislation was passed; the Badner Decree which
allowed absolutely no exceptions.
Although it could be argued that Heidegger had no reservations about taking the
rector position due to the fact that it was a great opportunity to further his career at the
university level and that all he needed to do was to follow the ways of the National
Socialists, upon further investigation, it was most likely not as simple of a decision for
Heidegger. His close friend, former teacher, and dedicatee of Being and Time, Edmund
Husserl, was a professor at the University of Freiburg, and was in fact Jewish.108 This
means that not only was Husserl stripped of his emeritus status at Freiburg, but he was
also stripped of his livelihood. Also, Faye points out that Heidegger and his wife even
composed a note to the Husserl family and stated that the legislation and decisions
made were “hard” but “reasonable.”109 Faye states that the letter showed just of how
strongly Heidegger felt about the Gleichschaltung, and the need for a shift in the
German university and his faith in National Socialist decrees. He stated not too long
after that he was acting “in full awareness of the necessity for the unconditional
implementation of the law on reconstructing the Civil Service.”110 Faye is swift to state
the obvious similarity between this statement by Heidegger and general National
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Socialist rhetoric; the insistent adjectives such as “full” and “unconditional.”111 Here
again, Faye fails to correctly translate the passage, and instead takes the liberty of
adding key words to the translation. A correct translation shows that Heidegger and his
wife must “act as if we unconditionally commit” to the German decrees. The addition of
the word “act” critically changes the interpretation of the passage which Faye cites.
Although many of the public speeches he gave during the time period, such as his
speech “The University in the New Reich”112 given to the Student Association at the
University of Heidelberg, in which he essentially subordinates the university system to
the state, suggests that he was enthusiastically supportive of the Nazis, the new
interpretation shows a sense of remorse and regret due to the events resulting in the
decree, as opposed to the unconditional devotion that Faye argues Heidegger
maintained. What seems most likely, according to the sources available, is that
Heidegger was so entrenched in his own personal philosophical growth and ambitions,
that he was willing to make certain sacrifices.
Another essential facet that goes along with the Gleichschaltung was the
“Fϋhrerprinzip.”113 This concept created a sort of dictatorship within the university level
that appeared to be in correlation to the dictatorship of Hitler and the Nazi Party.
Although the “rector-Fϋhrer” was elected by the faculty senate, he was in control of
selecting, by way of his personal free will, all of the other power positions involved in the
university. The “rector-Fϋhrer” had the ability to handpick the dean of the university.114
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With this, just as when Hitler took power over the state, eliminated all sense of
democracy at the university level. Heidegger drastically curtailed the powers of the
faculty senate and attempted to establish a direct link with the students, who were
sympathetic to the Nazis, in an effective manner. He attempted to put a boot camp
system in effect that would essentially prepare a line of philosophy-rulers for the
future.115 This is a goal that is suggested not only in Being and Time, but it is also
briefly suggested in his Rector’s Address. He states:
They will no longer permit Knowledge Service (Wissensdienst) to be the dull and
quick training for a “distinguished” profession. Because the statesman and the
teacher, the doctor, and the judge, the minister, and the architect, lead the being
(Dasein) of people and state, because they watch over it and keep it honed in its
fundamental relations to the world-shaping powers of human being, these
professions and the training of them have been entrusted to the Knowledge
Service.116
This “Knowledge Service,” which was the third part of Heidegger’s tripartite service
system that he outlines in his Rector’s Address, is an argument that the state of the
university system needs to be reconstructed around the education of future leaders of
Germany.
Heidegger was ushered into the role of Rektor-Fϋhrer due to the ministry and the
changing climate of the state for several reasons. Nazi leaders most likely had their aim
set on a multitude of tasks and positioned Heidegger to fulfill certain tasks according to
the Fϋhrerprinzip and the Gleichschaltung that the state had its eyes set upon.
Heidegger was a trophy for National Socialism. Being one of the leading philosophers
of the time, he brought a certain amount of intellectualism and legitimacy to the Nazi
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Party. For Heidegger, it seems as though he was more sympathetic to opportunity than
to Nazi ideologies. Many ideologies that were found within National Socialism were
ideologies that Heidegger held firmly in contempt. Modernization, technological
advance, and biological racism are ideals that are not defended by Heidegger. Thus,
what was the true connection between him and National Socialism if he had no interest,
and even held many of National Socialist ideals in contempt? Even with all of this as
evidence of the differences between his core beliefs and the root ideologies of National
Socialism, he opportunistically became a member of the Nazis, thus propelling his
career forward. Although he believed for a few years that National Socialism was
heading in the right direction, the manner in which they were achieving it seems less
associated to him, opposed to what Faye may argue.

Looking Back

Whether one is reflecting on Being and Time or the events of his life in the first
decades of the 20th century, it is clear that Martin Heidegger was a man of great
influence, and still to this day, is a man of great controversy. Being and Time alone is a
philosophical masterpiece that is without doubt one of the most influential works of the
20th century, but the influence of Heidegger goes well beyond just this single text. He
exercised a lifetime of influence, the most important of which came during the late
1920s and through the early 1940s while he focused his time at the university level.
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Throughout the entirety of Being and Time, specifically the last third, there is
authoritarian political rhetoric which was compatible with Nazi ideology. In this text,
Heidegger is calling for a renewed and united nation; a nation of “Being.” He is urging
the German nation to rid itself of all “inauthentic” people from taking part in the state.
Heidegger believed, very similarly to Hitler, that these people were a disease to the
German social climate, and that the only way for the German nation to become powerful
again was to reconstruct a homogenous nation and civil service. Although there seems
to be an apparent parallel to Hitler’s “final solution,” Heidegger’s goal was different.
While Hitler aimed to eliminate the Jews, Heidegger instead aimed to re-educate the
inauthentic peoplewith his own ideas and to make himself the Philosopher King of
National Socialism.
This idea for a philosophical dictatorship to be put in place in Germany is argued
for especially in the final sections the text; that a dictator would be the only true way for
the German nation to return to power. Being and Time emphasizes the fact that the
nation of “beings” needs a strong and centralized leader in order to keep the people on
course. This dictator is also called for by Heidegger “to make possible the moulding of
individuality in seeing and looking, [which] would be a pedagogical task for the stae.”117
This would ensure a nation of blind followers, although this was surely not the way in
which Heidegger would describe them. Heidegger would surely describe them as a
group of powerful and enlightened “beings” that have a uniform set of goals. For
Heidegger, “authenticity” is only possible within the “national Schicksalsgemeinschaft.”
However it is described, it effectively creates a homogenous group of people that would
decisionistically “choose it leader” and uncritically conform to a single person of power.
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As a professor at the university level for the majority of his professional career,
Martin Heidegger was in the ideal situation to proselytize and propagate these thoughts
and theories to youthful and impressionable minds. Being put on a stage in front of
adolescents that are eager to learn, especially in a field with such ambiguity as
philosophy, gave Heidegger a perfect platform to disseminate his own personal theories
and ideologies. During this time period, Heidegger was ideologically involved with his
theories of “being.” Although at the time these theories may not have been thought of
as politically important, after World War I these theories, as have been previously
discussed, had a clear and distinct political tenor. When the war came to an end, many
of the ideals discussed in Being and Time have been seen to coincide with many of the
ideologies of Hitler and the National Socialist German Worker’s Party.
Being named Rector of a university system is of key importance for the goals of
the Nazi party to be realized. Together with programs and organizations such as The
Hitler Youth, having control over the information that would be taught, in a legitimate
setting, would potentially form the minds of the youthful minds of Germany. Not only
were these minds of the youth of Germany, but they were also the adolescents that
would eventually become the educated elite of Germany. In turn Heidegger was
personally in charge of hiring and firing the instructors and determining what the
curriculum would be for the future teachers, businessmen, lawyers, and other
professions that had the greatest potential to hold positions of power. The Nazis and
Heidegger had similar aims in the re-education of the German people, but the final
goals were very different. The primary goal for the Nazis behind these steps was to
effectively create several generations of Nazi followers who would all collectively follow,
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out of their own free will and thought processes, the ideals set out by a strong central
leader, such as Hitler. Oddly enough, the culminating objective is remarkably
comparable to the one set out by Heidegger in Being and Time, although it soon
became apparent to Heidegger that his vision of the future and a “totally transformed
German Dasein,” was very different than Hitler’s. Heidegger opportunistically believed
that being elected Rector would lead to his re-education of the “inauthentic” people,
educating them in the official philosophy of Nazi Germany; the philosophy of Martin
Heidegger himself. This opportunism was obstructed when Heidegger soon realized
that the Nazis had no interest in his ideals, and were just using his name to bolster their
intellectual legitimacy.
Conservative revolutionary thought is another ideal that is abundant throughout
Heidegger’s philosophies and career. Heidegger consistently points to the tragedies of
modern society and technology. He believed that the modern world is “the ever more
encompassing attempt to objectify nature, to convert it into an object that can be
mastered and controlled.”118 The primary component of the modern world that
Heidegger attacks is natural scientific thought and the institution of modern technology.
Heidegger believes that technology puts a premium on the process of production, and
even promotes production over human beings and human values.119 According to
Michael Gillespie, “Heidegger was attracted to Nazism because he believed it offered a
solution to the crisis of Western civilization.”120 Gillespie’s interpretation effectively
debunks many of the anti-Semitic based theories that Faye defends.
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Martin Heidegger’s career and philosophies are controversial to this day.
Although it is commonly argued by scholars such as Wolin, Faye, and Fritsche that
although his authoritarian political attitudes began to form well before National Socialism
began, it can be argued instead that Heidegger was able to opportunistically adapt his
philosophical ideals to fit that of National Socialism in order to advance his personal
career and political agenda. Although there are also those who maintain that there was
a shift between Heidegger’s pre-Nazi and Nazi ideologies and that there are no political
theories that can or should be inferred from his texts—specifically Being and Time—the
two periods of his life and work are so important to both philosophy and German
interwar history, that they should be examined, and examined together. It is nearly
impossible to ignore Heidegger’s opportunism that is vivid while examining his career,
Being and Time, and the events and goals of the Nazi period in Germany during the
early twentieth century.
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CHAPTER 4

Ernst Jϋnger

A Biographical Glimpse

Born in Heidelberg, Germany in 1895, Ernst Jϋnger was the oldest of six
children. Jϋnger’s father played a major role in his development during childhood but
unfortunately his father’s role was pertinent in an adverse manner due to a lack of
emotional affection. His father, a professional chemist and pharmacist, is commonly
depicted in Jϋnger’s memoirs as being extremely distant emotionally from Jϋnger, or
from any of his siblings for that matter.121 His mother, on the other hand, was quite the
opposite. She was overwhelmingly warm, loving, and affectionate. Although she was
very caring and tender towards her children, she was commonly “overpowered by the
domineering personality and charisma of the patriarch.”122
Though his father was very unaffectionate, he was highly interested in the
intellectual development of his children, especially Ernst. During the majority of his
youth, the Jϋnger family was constantly on the move. He was constantly being uprooted
and transplanted to different educational institutions. Different schools meant an
assortment of varying conditions to which Ernst needed to constantly adjust himself:
different settings, people, friends, teachers, rules. Taking this into account, it is no
wonder that Ernst was very dispassionate about and disconnected from his education.
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In addition, Jϋnger believed that the educational system had too many rules and
regulations. Rules and regulations, such as the ones enforced in school, were against
the innate complexion of Jϋnger’s mind. He was a daydreamer; the physical walls of a
classroom could not contain his mind or imagination. As Elliot Neaman puts it, “he
belonged to the generation of youth in Germany that rebelled against the philistinism
and suffocating Bϋrgerlichkeit of Wilhelmine Germany.”123
While the classroom could not hold Jϋnger’s attention very effectively, he
believed that he was destined to find something that could. “The tendency of flight into
a dreamworld sustained him well into adulthood,”124 and in 1911 he joined the
Wandervogel, a part of the German youth movement. The Wandervogel taught
“defiance, hate, yearning, love,” and everything that had been “repressed, denied [and]
forcibly sublimated”125 during his youth due to his authoritarian father.
In 1913 Jϋnger left home in search of more adventure and excitement. He
decided to join the French Foreign Legion in Algeria. Here he made an unfortunate
discovery; the dreams he had of the adventures awaiting him were crushed. Not only
were his youthful exotic fantasies of Africa crushed, but Jϋnger was also captured by a
group of mercenaries.126 Although it may seem improbable due to their past tensions,
Ernst’s father came to his rescue, liberating him from mercenary captivity.
After returning home in 1914, Jϋnger reached a pact with his father. The pact
consisted of a single agreement; if Ernst completed high school, his father would fully
fund a trip for the two of them to go on a mountain climbing expedition to Mount
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Kilimanjaro, a trip which would surely fulfill Ernst’s adventurous fantasies. The Great
War broke out soon thereafter. Jϋnger presumed this was his chance at real adventure
and jumped at the opportunity to take a high school proficiency examination. Jϋnger
passed the exam and subsequently enlisted in the German military, specifically the
Fusilier Regiment 73. After two months of basic military training Jϋnger was sent to the
front lines. The trenches are where Jϋnger’s fantasies of excitement and adventure
were finally realized. Carrying a notebook documenting his experiences he noted that,
“the things waiting for us would never happen again, and I anticipated them with the
greatest curiosity.”127
The war was exactly what the young Jϋnger yearned for. He was quickly
awarded for his extreme bravery during the war as he was shot and wounded a number
of times, including being shot in the lung, and was wounded a total of fourteen times
throughout the war.128 He was also awarded the Pour le Mérite, the highest order of the
German army, by the Kaiser personally.129 Jϋnger was the youngest to ever receive
such an honor. After the war ended, Jϋnger was one of the 100,000 men that were
allowed to remain in the restricted army permitted per terms of the Treaty of Versailles
and was put in charge of reconstructing the training manual “designed to introduce
future soldiers to the technology and tactics” of possible warfare in the future.130
The notes that Jϋnger compiled throughout the entire war served as the
groundwork for one of his most significant works, Im Stahlgewittern (Storm of Steel).
Although it was just his first piece of literary work, it was arguably his most popular.
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Storm of Steel is also credited with asserting many of Jϋnger’s values, philosophical
ideals, and political viewpoints. The manner in which Jϋnger dealt with the horrors of
war is precisely the reason, not only why he was so popular, but also why he was such
a controversial figure.
Ernst Jϋnger might be the most controversial of the three intellectuals examined
in this study. Although he is noted as being a leading Nazi literary figure, Jϋnger was
never an official member of the National Socialist Party—a fact to which he later would
repeatedly point when defending the events of his life, particularly during Nazi control of
Germany between 1933 and 1945. Jϋnger was commonly attacked due to the fact that
his texts glorified many of the same ideals that are commonly associated with the
National Socialists; war, work, and nationalism.
The relationship between Ernst Jϋnger and National Socialism is wrought with
tension. Though some of the basic principles found in his earliest works appear to
parallel many of the focal points of the NSDAP, this is a misconception. As we will see,
Jϋnger was envisioning a governmental system that would not be satisfied through the
Weimar Republic or National Socialism. Many of his critics, such as Elliot Neaman, Kurt
Sontheimer, and Nikolaus Wachsmann, have argued that Jϋnger was a proponent of
the NSDAP. These historians arguments parallel each other in many respects pointing
to the fact that Junger published articles in the NS – Briefe (National Socialist - Letters),
glorified work as did the National Socialists, and aestheticized war. In reality, though
Jϋnger indeed published a small number of articles in the NS – Briefe, he in fact
published articles in numerous publications and articles of various political affiliations.
He published articles in the Völkischer Beobachter (Nationalist Observer), Das
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Tagebuch (The Diary), a Liberal publication, the Deutsches Volkstum (German Folk),
and was an editor for Der Vormarsch (The Advance). In these various periodicals and
publications, not only is there evidence that supports the arguments made by Neaman
and Wachsmann and that shows Jϋnger’s support of National Socialism, but there is
also evidence of his resistance of National Socialism. In 1929 Jϋnger published an
article entitled “‘Nationalismus’ und Nationalsozialismus” in Das Tagebuch. In this
article Jϋnger attacks the “nationalist” movement, especially the NSDAP.131 For Jϋnger,
this article, along with his publication of On the Marble Cliffs are two primary instances
where a split is definitely evident between his ideals and those of National Socialism.
The affinity Jϋnger had for Nazi ideals was due to his experiences in World War
I. As a youth Jϋnger was always searching for adventure. At the age of nineteen,
Jϋnger found the adventure he was searching for; he entered the German armed
forces. He was sent to the front lines after a very brief and basic training. When he
finally arrived at the front lines, he came to the realization of what the Great War was,
and how it would be fought: the horrors of poison gas weaponry and trench warfare.

Der Sturm

Ernst Jϋnger was an instant phenomenon when he first broke into the literary
scene. His first text, Storm of Steel,132 was received very well. This piece of writing is a
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compilation of Jϋnger’s wartime diary entries and notations, collected and composed in
a single, coherent text. Jϋnger received immediate acclaim for this text due to the
exuberance and honesty with which he expressed himself, especially the unflinching
detail of his own personal experiences in World War I. In the end, Jϋnger did much
more than simply compose a text compiling his wartime memoirs; he essentially
became a polarizing figure throughout the Weimar years in Germany.
World War I had an obvious impact on the young Ernst Jϋnger. Storm of Steel
begins with the young and naïve Jϋnger getting his feet wet when he saw his first
“action” in Orainville. A rather sobering moment for Jϋnger, he found out that war,
especially in the Great War, was not at all what he had expected. Instead of the
excitement of dodging bullets and hand to hand combat, he found himself in a different
scenario. “Instead of the dangers we had hoped for, only mud and work and sleepless
nights had fallen to our lot, and the conquest of these called for a heroism that was little
to our taste.”133 Although this was not exactly what Jϋnger had hoped for, his fortune
was soon to change, although again, not necessarily to what he had expected.
Before Jϋnger had gained any combat experience, he was brought face to face
with a horrifying reality of war. He described a morning when he awoke to a corpse in
utter surprise and horror.134 He stated that the French must have gone months without
burying their fallen soldiers. After this first glimpse of death due to war, Jϋnger seemed
as though he had a legitimate feeling of horror, but soon after he stated, “Although I
made up my mind to omit all comments from this book, I should like all the same to say
a word or two about this first glimpse of horrors. It is a moment so important in the
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experience of war. The horrible was undoubtedly a part of that irresistible attraction that
drew us into the war.”135 Although he first described the horrors of war with surprise, he
soon described how it became rather mundane. He gave a colorful description of the
change in perceptions of human loss in the war:
We looked at all these dead with dislocated limbs, distorted faces, and the
hideous colours of decay, as though we walked in a dream through a garden full
of strange plants, and we could not realize at first what we had all around us. But
finally we were so accustomed to the horrible that if we came on a dead body
anywhere on a fire-step or in a ditch we give it no more than a passing thought
and recognized it as we would a stone or a tree…136
This description essentially showed the growth, or rather the transformation of a
youthful, adventure seeking Ernst Jϋnger, into Ernst Jϋnger the hardened, World War I
German soldier. The tone of his text followed suit, transforming from hopes to events;
from yearning, to experiencing.
Battle soon follows. The excited Jϋnger was about to see his first real combat
experience. He expressed the anxious enthusiasm he felt while preparing and awaiting
battle. But as soon as he arrived, it had ended. The excitement that Jϋnger had was
that of the yearning to test his nerve and wit against an opponent; to feel that moment
when either he or his enemy would fall. He explained:
The battle of Les Eparges was the first I was in, and it was not at all what I had
expected. I had taken part in a great military operation without coming within
sight of the enemy. It was later that I experienced hand-to-hand fighting, that
supreme moment of warfare when the infantryman comes into the open and
when the chaotic vacancy of the battlefield has its murderous and decisive
interludes.137
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Although the battle of Les Eparges was not what Jϋnger had expected and hoped for,
he would have plenty of hand-to-hand combat to experience throughout his tenure in
war.
Jϋnger then continued to describe the day-to-day life in the trenches. The
majority of the text was consumed with the tedium of sleepless nights, taking post duty,
and having the company of rats, mice, and cats that were not able to escape the fire
between the trenches. This monotony was occasionally highlighted with death, a brief
bit of sleep and rest, some coffee, and some beer swilling. Even the bit of excitement of
a soldier manning the post getting shot seemed to have become boring and
monotonous to Jϋnger. “One of a post suddenly collapses in a stream of blood, shot in
the head. His fellows tear the field-dressing from his tunic and bind him up. […]
Somebody throws a shovelful of soil over the red patch and every one goes about his
business.”138
Increasing emotional detachment is another theme which Jϋnger portrays in the
text. He describes his emotional state and that of the other veteran soldiers in his
battalion as no longer being “whitefaced”139 and scared; they are now “callous.”140 He
described the veterans as looking at battle as though it was sport.141 He wrote of
several stories of how members of his battalion used practical jokes in order to entice
and eventually anger the English into firing at them, which was clearly an exercise in
futility. These examples of emotional detachment are another way that Jϋnger was able
to depict the horrors of war. War for Jϋnger became a path to manhood; war was able
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to toughen boys and turn them into men. These experiences were necessary for
Jϋnger to tell his story of war.
Jϋnger then detailed some of the most horrible events that he had had to endure
at Guillemont. Upon hearing of his platoon’s new station he stated, “I heard a
monotonous tale of crouching all day in shell-holes with no one on either flank and no
trenches communicating with the rear, of unceasing attacks, of dead bodies littering the
ground, of maddening thirst, of wounded and dying, and of a lot besides.”142 This
portion of the text detailed the most gruesome and horrid tales of his time in World War
I. The description Jϋnger gives of his personal guide is that of shock. Jϋnger describes
the guide’s appearance:
The face half-framed by the steel rim of the helmet was unmoved; the voice
accompanied by the sound of battle droned on, and the impression they made on
me was one of unearthly solemnity. One could see that the man had been
through horror to the limit of despair and there had learnt to despise it. Nothing
was left but supreme and superhuman indifference.143
Jϋnger repeatedly described tales of wounded that he states will never escape his
memory such as tales of his profusely bleeding comrades reaching to him asking for
help, and Jϋnger knowing there was nothing that he can do to help, or stories of English
prisoners having to be shot and killed because “going over the top” with a prisoner was
simply unrealistic – it would only put the prisoner and, more importantly, the German
soldiers in even more danger.144
Though much of the war that Jϋnger portrays was one of death and struggle,
Jϋnger also spent a brief amount of time expounding another characteristic of war; a
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characteristic to which Jϋnger attributed his life being saved numerous times. This
characteristic was that of luck. In one memorable glimpse, Jϋnger recollected a day
when his troop was succumbing to a lengthy bout of shelling from the English. Jϋnger
and his battalion retreated to a farm, and when the shelling came to a pause Jϋnger
describes the events that followed. “In the evening the same performance [shelling]
was repeated; only this time, as it was fine, I stood outside the farmhouse. The next
shell fell right in the middle of it.”145 Jϋnger then goes on to state, in a rather resonating
manner, “Such are the chances of war. Here more than anywhere was a case of little
causes and great effects. Seconds and millimetres make the difference.”146
Although Storm of Steel is commonly portrayed as solely a memoir of war, it
could also be considered a collection of life lessons. Much of what Jϋnger described
dealt with experiences in which a lesson was taught and though many of these
experiences occurred by way of war, battle and death, Jϋnger seems to have been
more interested in the lessons and experiences to be gained. Though placed in the
setting of war, many of the lessons and experiences that Jϋnger detailed can be applied
to multiple scenarios, but since his personal experiences took place in a war setting, it
was the best way for him to describe them. Lessons of leadership are strewn
throughout the entire text, as well as the ideals of personal responsibility. He mentioned
at the beginning of the text the significance of speech and rhetoric while in a position of
leadership. He stated:
An officer should never be parted from his men in the moment of danger on any
account whatever. Danger is the supreme moment of his career, his chance to
show his manhood at its best. Honour and gallantry make him master of the
hour. What is more sublime than to face death at the head of a hundred men?
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Such a one will never find obedience fail him, for courage runs through the ranks
like wine.147
While he was detailing an event and a speech that was given to him and his fellow
soldiers, this was a lesson that Jϋnger followed through his entire military career, and
also a lesson that is applicable in various scenarios. According to Jϋnger, leadership is
a characteristic that is universal in the manner that it works. Strong leadership can put
sufficient confidence in men to face a struggle of any kind.
This advocacy for strong centralized leadership in the military can be paralleled
to his support for an authoritarian government. In Storm of Steel, Jϋnger states that he
believes a strong leader, such as a military officer, is capable of infusing confidence and
courage into his followers to the extent of overcoming any obstacle. Transitioning this
belief into the context of Weimar Germany, it would be inferred that a strong enough
public leader would be capable of infusing the German people with enough confidence
and courage to stand up to the status quo of Weimar. This inference was realized with
the emergence of Adolf Hitler into the public sphere, and the rise to power of the Nazi
Party.
Storm of Steel is commonly represented as classic National Socialist propaganda
or idealism; Elliot Neaman and Nikolaus Wachsmann are just two historians that argue
this point to some extent. This argument misrepresents what Jϋnger was attempting to
accomplish in many of his texts. Although it can be claimed that Jϋnger simply glorifies
war, instead he is glorifying the existential experience of war and struggle. He refers to
his own individual experience, and sometimes the experiences of other soldiers in
whom he had a significant emotional investment. Focusing his attention on his own
147
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personal experiences throughout the war, he does not put much emphasis on Germany,
other than the fact that he himself is German fighting with the German forces.
The ending of the text is particularly important within this discussion. Jϋnger
does not end the original version of his text with the Versailles Treaty, or even with
Germany losing the war. Instead, he concludes his text with himself receiving the
prestigious Pour le Mérite on September 18, 1918. It was not until four years later, in
1924, that he made an addition to the end of the text,148 namely, a nationalistically
charged quote: “Though force without and barbarity within conglomerate in somber
clouds, yet so long the blade of a sword will strike a spark in the night may it be said:
Germany lives and Germany shall never go under!”149
This addition is not to be overlooked. The addition of such openly nationalistic
tone changes much of the complexion of the text as a whole. It transforms a text that is
almost solely concerned with glorifying and aestheticizing the individual experience of
war, to glorifying the German nation. This quote transforms an individualistic and
apolitical Jϋnger, into the Jϋnger that took on the role of one of Germany’s “political
ideologue[s],”150 and who allegedly “preached the gospel of Auschwitz.”151 The addition
of this nationalist conclusion to Storm of Steel marked a significant change for much of
his career. Jϋnger, through novels and articles became one of the prevailing voices of
German Nationalism.
The reasoning behind this transition is due to the inability of the Weimar Republic
to stabilize the economic and social climate of Germany. Nationalist groups, most
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notably the NSDAP, called for radical change under the mantra of nationalism. These
groups were in opposition to the “material” and “intellectual…filth” of Weimar. These
ideas captivated Jϋnger, and as Wachsmann states, when Jϋnger “had heard Hitler
speak at a mass meeting in Munich, [he was] deeply impressed by this ‘event of
elemental force.’”152 With this shift to a radical nationalist stance, Jϋnger thus edited
Storm of Steel in 1924 in order to reflect his new ideals.
Although the versions of the text appearing after 1929 had a significantly stronger
nationalistic tone, the final message that Jϋnger passed along stayed the same. It was
the last message that Jϋnger incorporated into his text that finally allowed him to realize
his position in the world. It may have taken him four years of fighting in the freezing wet
trenches of Europe, but he figured out his own identity, something he struggled with
throughout his youth. While he was searching for adventure and excitement when he
was a young boy, he found himself plagued with more confusion. It took World War I to
clear the way for Jϋnger to find himself. Jϋnger described the final lesson he absorbed
from the war in the following way:
And almost without any thought of mine, the idea of the Fatherland had been
distilled from all these afflictions in a clearer and brighter essence. That was the
final winnings in a game on which so often all had been asked: the nation was no
longer for me and empty thought veiled in symbols; and how could it have been
otherwise when I had seen so many die for its sake, and been schooled myself to
stake my life for its credit every minute, day and night, without a thought? And
so, strange as it may sound, I learned from this very four years’ schooling in force
and in all the fantastic extravagance of material warfare that life has no depth of
meaning except when it is pledged for an ideal, and that there are ideals in
comparison with which the life of an individual and even of a people has no
weight. And though the aim for which I fought as an individual, as an atom in the
whole body of the army, was not to be achieved, though material force cast us,
apparently, to the earth, yet we learned once and for all to stand for a cause and
if necessary to fall as befitted men.153
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Though there was a certain amount of nationalistic resolve in it, Jϋnger’s final assertions
in Storm of Steel are important in order to understand his psyche. He discovered that
his role in the world was to fight for and ensure the greatness of Germany. Jϋnger
yearned for Germany to once again become a nation at the pinnacle of greatness.
Scholarly discussion concerning Jϋnger and Storm of Steel has been contentious
and controversial. The perceptions of what Jϋnger was attempting to portray, share,
and reflect upon is up for debate, but there are several points of consistency throughout
the debates. The glorification of war is an evident point. There is another point of
emphasis that is often only briefly discussed, if it is discussed at all. That is the notion
that Jϋnger wanted to make it clear just how difficult and destructive the First World War
was, not only on a national and military level, but more importantly on a personal level.
As we have already seen, the Weimar years in Germany were not very
welcoming for German veterans of World War I. For many of the men who had fought
in the war, the Treaty of Versailles took much of their lives away due to the drastic
reduction of the German military. Veterans no longer had jobs or income that they
could rely upon. On top of that was their physical and mental fitness. Many veterans
were injured or deformed, and in a Weimar Germany that put increasing emphasis on
beauty, where did that put all of these men? In addition, with the debts the German
government incurred in order to finance the war effort, as well as the reparations that
were demanded from Germany in the Treaty of Versailles, there were no funds that
could be spared for these men. Their mental and psychological condition is not always
brought up in this discussion either. These soldiers lived for years in trenches, covered
in mud while dodging constant shelling and gunfire. Surprised, but also relieved, when
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the war ended and Germany defeated, the return home for many men proved difficult.
Coming home, especially with the “Stab-in-the-Back” legend that became so popular,
made it even more difficult for the men to integrate back into society.
Is it possible that Jϋnger may have composed and published this compilation of
his personal war memoirs in order to give himself, as well as other World War I
veterans, an identity within society? By creating this text, Jϋnger essentially gave the
reader a sample of war; an illustration of the war that so many German World War I
veterans had to fight, survived, and the memories they had to live with. He consistently
stated how difficult the war was to endure, repeatedly declaring that World War I was
“no child’s-play.”154 Jϋnger discussed the sacrifices that he and his fellow soldiers
made throughout the war. Though he never deflects the blame to anyone or anything
else for his own personal choices in joining the war efforts, he asserted:
Our losses in young officers were again frightfully heavy during these days.
Every time afterwards that I heard prejudice and depreciation on the lips of the
mob, I thought of these men who saw it out to the bitter end with so little parade
and with so fine an ardour. But after all—what is the mob? It sees in everything
nothing but the reflection of its own manners. It is quite clear to me that these
men were our best. However cleverly people may talk and write, there is nothing
to set against self-sacrifice that is not pale, insipid, and miserable.155
This emotional description of the war appeared to be a salute to those men who fell and
gave their lives to their country and their cause. It is easy, through this statement, to
see the chasm between those at home and those who fought on the front lines. This
chasm generated a sense of contempt that was held by many soldiers upon returning
home; a contempt that could easily be channeled against the supporters of Weimar by
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military leaders such as Hindenburg, or those who aestheticized and glorified war, such
as Hitler.156
Storm of Steel, other than being a great personal literary achievement for Ernst
Jϋnger, is seen by many scholars157 as expressing the personal and political ideals of
Jϋnger. When questions concerning Jϋnger and his ideologies are posed, Storm of
Steel is often times the “evidence” of what Jϋnger would supposedly believe or pursue.
According to these historians, the memoir contains answers hidden in its contents and
its style.
An already controversial figure due to his glorification of war and the war
experience becomes more controversial due to what some scholars believe is a push
for a National Socialist revolution. Due to the glorification of war in Storm of Steel it
seems almost natural to compare the text to the ideals and virtues instilled by Adolf
Hitler and the National Socialist German Worker’s Party.
In this work alone, there are several different levels on which to compare Jϋnger
and National Socialism. The glorification of war is the most obvious of these levels, but
is also the shallowest. It is simple to see the connection between Jϋnger and the Nazis
on the surface. Throughout the latter editions of Storm of Steel Jϋnger details the
greatness of war and how “there is no lovelier a death in the world”158 than to die for
Germany. On this level, there are certain parallels to National Socialism, but there are
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also certain misrepresentations. In both Jϋnger’s text and the ideals of Hitler’s National
Socialism there exists a glorification of war and struggle. The misrepresentation of this
premise is based on the nature of this glorification. Hitler argues that war is a national
endeavor; a national experience for the betterment of Germany. In contrast, Jϋnger
asserts, specifically in his first edition, that war is glorified solely as an individual
experience. Nikolaus Wachsmann, who comes to a similar conclusion, states:
For Hitler and other leading Nazis, the war was in the first place a national
experience, and they focused on its political outcome: the fight against the
republic domestically and against the Versailles settlement abroad. In contrast,
Jϋnger in his early works never instrumentalizes war for political ends—the main
aim for Jϋnger the writer is the heroisation of Jϋnger the Soldier.159
This contrast in ideals is also present when looking at Hitler’s ideological treatise Mein
Kampf160 and the alleged ideological treatise of Jϋnger, Storm of Steel. In Mein Kampf
Hitler argues that “his personal experience is entirely subsumed in the national
disaster”161 of losing World War I, and that he declares that the day of German defeat in
World War I was the first time he had shed tears since the funeral of his mother.162
Jϋnger, however takes a different approach to the end of World War I. In contrast to
Hitler, who saw World War I as a “national disaster,” Jϋnger concludes his original
treatise with “Jϋnger’s personal triumph of being awarded the Pour le Mérite.”163
On this level, which Wachsmann describes as being “superficial,”164 there are
some basic similarities, but when examined in more detail, Jϋnger and Hitler have very
different opinions. Hitler asserts that war is important on a political level where the
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struggle is a national struggle. In contrast, Jϋnger believes that war is a struggle for
personal survival and individual merits. Whereas Hitler views World War I as an utter
disappointment and failure, Jϋnger views it, especially in his early editions of Storm of
Steel, as a success filled with personal achievements, honors, and quenching his thirst
for adventure.
Storm of Steel is a text that is essential to review when examining post-World
War I Germany, or the Weimar Republic, and even proves to be useful in any general
examination of war. In Germany, Storm of Steel was an instant sensation for Jϋnger.
His work allowed people to realize what soldiers in the Great War had endured. It
allowed the citizens at home to relate to, and sympathize with, the soldiers who returned
home after the war and, in the case of Germany, after defeat. Storm of Steel was a
work that comprised a wide array of literary themes. On a superficial level the text
appeared to be a simple list of experiences and emotions felt by a soldier at the
frontlines of war. If nothing more, Storm of Steel gave Jϋnger publicity and a platform to
proliferate some of his later arguments and ideologies.

Although Storm of Steel is

probably Jϋnger’s most controversial and popular text, to understand his place in
Weimar literary and intellectual life, one must also survey his other significant works.

Der Arbeiter

Though Storm of Steel is arguably Jϋnger’s most noteworthy composition due to
his aestheticization of war and death, he often reflected on his frontline experiences in
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his other early works. Another of Jϋnger’s texts that is necessary to include in any
examination of Jϋnger is The Worker, which was published in 1932.165 This is Jϋnger’s
“last and final reflection on the battlefield experience in the trenches of World War I.”166
The Worker is another example of controversial writing. Much like Storm of Steel, there
is much in this text that anticipates the National Socialist State. As Elliot Neaman
describes it, “The Worker was Jϋnger’s most protofascist book.”167 Late in his career
Jϋnger must have realized the parallels between this text and the Nazi state and he had
the text blocked from being translated to other languages (including English).168
The Worker is Ernst Jϋnger’s argument for a totalitarian state which is run by
wartime front soldiers, workers, and their leaders. Thomas Nevin allocates the phrase
“cybernetic storm troops”169 to this group. For Jϋnger, the text is a glimpse into the near
future of what the political and social spheres of Germany could, and according to
Jϋnger, should, look like. As he began composing Der Arbeiter in October of 1930,170
Jϋnger was taking the position of “a distant observer, detecting global historicalmetaphysical movements.”171 According to Jϋnger, this distance was essential due to
the fact that “daily German politics became too insignificant to be of interest” to himself;
an attitude typical among conservative intellectuals who often prided themselves on
taking an “apolitical” stance. He was looking at a large-scale interpretation of global
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politics. Jϋnger also points to this distance from Weimar politics that he created while
composing Der Arbeiter in order to defend some of the theories he illustrates in the text.
Der Arbeiter is Jϋnger’s call for the soldier-worker to rise up. The Worker,172
according to Jϋnger, “is neither a social class nor an economic force, but simply the
type of soldier, also called warrior, who fought in the trenches of war that had functioned
as a melting pot, in which the petit bourgeois, the peasant, and the proletarian stood
shoulder to shoulder.”173 For Jϋnger the Worker embodied the same virtues of the
soldier; discipline and self-sacrifice. The Worker was also not simply a German
phenomenon. Jϋnger believed that the Worker would come to rule in countries
throughout the globe, and essentially rule the world. He believed that due to Germany’s
political history, it was the perfect social and political climate for such a change. Jϋnger
maintained that since Germany was never truly a liberal-bourgeois society, it is the only
country where the Worker is ready to rule (the Soviet Union ranks a distant second).174
Jϋnger believed that the process of generating a dependency on the Worker in
Germany had already begun taking place during the Weimar years. Jϋnger argued that
the modern world would increase the “predictability, efficiency, and discipline”175 of the
Worker. The one necessary piece of the puzzle that Jϋnger believed was missing was
that of a “‘young and ruthless leadership’ to lead the way to a new state … where
‘military discipline’ and ‘labor duty’ would be implemented ‘from top to bottom.’”176 Here,
it is apparent that Jϋnger is advocating a party much like the NSDAP.
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Although on the surface it may appear to be a sign of political affiliation for
Jϋnger, it is again important to reflect on context. During the composition of The
Worker, the socio-economic climate was deplorable. As a result of the stock-market
crash of 1929, Germany, along with much of the rest of the world, was in great financial
crisis. Included in that was the steeply rising rate of unemployment. Like many on the
right, Jϋnger already despised the Weimar Republic and he became even more critical
of it due to its inability to rise out of the depression. Not only was The Worker a call for
a governing system that was dynamically different than that of Weimar, it also instilled
some of the traditions and virtues of the old Prussian state that oversaw great economic
growth leading up to World War I. With steep unemployment rates, a vision such as
Jϋnger’s, which emphasized the importance of the workforce and promises an influx of
employment opportunities, would surely draw interest. These contextual issues are
often ignored by historians such as Neaman, Wachsmann, and Kittler in their
interpretations of The Worker.
Wolf Kittler makes a relatively important observation in his article noting that The
Worker is significantly different from Jϋnger’s previous texts, especially Storm of Steel.
The difference Kittler observes is that The Worker reads like a manifesto that “aims at
predicting the future destiny of mankind on planet earth in the age of technology,”177
whereas Storm of Steel and many of his other previous texts are lucid examinations on
his past personal experiences. Some commentators, such as Kittler and Wachsmann,
view this distinct shift in Jϋnger’s writing style as a more direct parallel between his
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views and the ideologies of National Socialism, although Jϋnger was careful to refrain
from ever mentioning a specific party in The Worker.178
The conclusion that is drawn by many, including Neaman, Wachsmann, and
Kittler, is that it is the text “was Jϋnger’s most protofascist book.”179 Looking specifically
and solely at the text, this is an acceptable conclusion. There are many examples
throughout the text that directly anticipate National Socialism. What these accounts of
The Worker lack, is a contextual interpretation. By contextualizing The Worker, the
interpretation is strengthened. Jϋnger, as in the vast majority of his other texts and
articles, is arguing for a radical change from the Weimar Republic, and in the case of
The Worker, is arguing for a transformation very comparable to the change maintained
within the ideals of National Socialism.

Marble Cliffs

Storm of Steel, although it is Jϋnger’s first and arguably most influential and
recognized work, is far from being the only one of importance. A work that is arguably
just as important is On the Marble Cliffs,180 first published in 1939. In comparison to
Storm of Steel, it is strikingly different; in fact they are near opposites in many respects.
On the Marble Cliffs is a fictitious story whereas Storm of Steel is a memoir compiled of
Jϋnger’s own personal war diaries and notations. On the Marble Cliffs is also widely
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thought of today as a parable of the times in which it was written, and as part of a
hidden agenda held by Jϋnger, whereas Storm of Steel is widely recognized for simply
being firsthand encounters and experiences of what Jϋnger faced at war. Finally, and
possibly the most important difference between these two works by Jϋnger is the fact
that, while Storm of Steel is driven by individuality and adventure, On the Marble Cliffs
suggests a definite political and societal milieu.
On the Marble Cliffs is a novel composed by Ernst Jϋnger in the years following
the collapse of the Weimar Republic. First published in 1939, the text was relatively
popular selling approximately 35,000 copies in the spring of 1940 alone.181 Although
the work showed some promise in terms of sales, the “authorities” stopped further
printing of the text after the spring of 1940.182 The reason for the discontinuation of
printing is most certainly due to the material that was in the text. Though Jϋnger denied
the idea that the text was an attack on the Nazi party, it is relatively certain that the
“fictitious” novel was indeed a parable of the late 1920s and early 1930s in Germany.
On the Marble Cliffs begins with a rather lengthy description of the setting. The
majority of the text takes place in and around the Marble Cliffs, including the hermitage
and herbarium of the narrator. The narrator, who is most definitely a “fictitious” Ernst
Jϋnger, lives with his brother Ortho, his cook and house-keeper, Lampusa, and the
narrator’s illegitimate “love-child” Erio. The narrator and Ortho were soldiers and had
just returned from war at the “Campagna.” Their goal was to simply live a “life of
leisure.”183 The two brothers would consume their time in the research of botany,
ichthyology, and entomology. Not surprisingly, these were the same scientific studies in
181
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which Jϋnger immersed himself when returning from the war. Jϋnger even was able to
include some of his botanical and entomological research within the parameters of the
text.
Just on the other side of the Marble Cliffs was the town of Mauretania. Several
times throughout the work, the narrator and Ortho travel to the town and on one
occasion the narrator introduces the chief antagonist of the text, Chief Ranger, the
Grand Master of Mauretania. Chief Ranger is undoubtedly a characterization of Adolf
Hitler. Chief Ranger is always portrayed in a dark light; rendered as a strong and witty
villain, intimidating everyone in his path. He is the leading politician with a large
following of thugs whom no one dares oppose. He and his gang are traveling through
Mauretania gathering “support” for his crusade through the area towards the Marina, the
Marble Cliffs, and ultimately the hermitage of the narrator. The narrator, brother Ortho
and the other members of the hermitage meet Chief Ranger and his following, and
combat ensues at the conclusion of the text.
The material enveloped in this relatively short novel is essential to the
examination at hand. Not only is this text clearly an attack on National Socialism and
Hitler himself, it also puts Ernst Jϋnger in the role leading the aforementioned attack.
From the very first paragraph to the end of the text, Jϋnger voices his own ideologies
and desires.
In the very first paragraph of On the Marble Cliffs, the narrator reminisces about
“times of happiness.”184 The narrator soon qualifies “times of happiness” as the times
before the war broke out. Though this is a very brief flashback, it is noteworthy. If
interpreted as a parody of the National Socialist takeover, the war, “Campagna” as it is
184
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labeled in the text, is none other than World War I. Thus, the “times of happiness” that
the narrator, or Jϋnger, is alluding to would correspond to pre-World War I Germany. In
just this very small segment of the first chapter of On Marble Cliffs, the reader can
identify some of Jϋnger’s basic values. Jϋnger yearned for Germany to revert back to
the days of glory, the days of the great German Reich. Of course, with his affinity for a
militaristic, centralized state, this is no surprise. On the Marble Cliffs clearly shows the
connection of the “fictional” text to the ideologies of Jϋnger. Neaman reflects on the text
in a sympathetic manner defending Jϋnger with the notion that On the Marble Cliffs
could be interpreted in many different ways.185 Though there are definite qualities and
characteristics of a fictional novel in On the Marble Cliffs, Jϋnger includes a plethora of
personal ideals within it. Writers such as Wachsmann and Thomas Nevin conclude that
the text was a turning point for Jϋnger, and his “inner emigration”186 away from Nazism.
On the Marble Cliffs, also follows a historical timeline that is, in fact, extremely
similar to the historical timeline of Germany from the 1920s to the 1930s. Through
means of recollections, the narrator continually mentions events that either happened in
Germany, or in Jϋnger’s personal or political life during the same time period. These
recollections of the narrator can be construed in various ways, whether it be an
explanation, an apology, or an acknowledgement of respect. The use of vocabulary is
also important in this examination as Jϋnger uses specific language in order to elicit a
certain response from the reader.
Towards the beginning of the text, in chapter seven, the narrator begins to
discuss the power and aims of Chief Ranger and his “Order.” In a memorable section,
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the narrator details how he and his brother Ortho once were attracted to the order lead
by Chief Ranger, and how it was a mistake. He states:
Later I was to hear Brother Ortho say of our Mauretanian period that mistakes
become errors only when persisted in. It was a saying that gained in truth for me
when I thought back to our position when the Order attracted us. There are
periods of decline when the pattern fades to which our inmost life must conform.
When we enter upon them we sway and lose our balance. From hollow joy we
sink to leaden sorrow, and past and future acquire a new charm from our sense
of loss. So we wander aimlessly in the irretrievable past or in distant Utopias; but
the fleeting moment we cannot grasp.187
This example is similar to the first as it is another illustration of how Jϋnger used On the
Marble Cliffs as a stage to present his own personal views. On a superficial level, the
narrator is explaining how he and Ortho used to be attracted to the stances and
prospects of Chief Ranger’s order, and how it was a lapse in judgment. Examining
slightly deeper, this can easily be seen as Jϋnger’s personal excuse for his initial
fascination with the National Socialist organization. This is important on two levels.
First, Jϋnger is actually conceding his interest and fascination with the National Socialist
group, and secondly, he is essentially stating that through all of the appeal, the
organization was unable to perform in the manner that he had expected.
In this statement Jϋnger is also admitting his error. He states that in “periods of
decline…we sway and lose our balance.”188 He is essentially arguing that he was
fascinated with the National Socialist group due to the “decline” of Germany. His
argument fundamentally is based on the premise that because the Weimar Republic
was failing to lead Germany out of the disrepute of losing a war and multiple
depressions, the most sensible action to take at the time was to search for a group that
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demanded change in the most radical sense. Jϋnger appears to be excusing his
National Socialist sympathies by qualifying them with the human condition of suffering
from weakness during time of hardship; Jϋnger is arguing that his sympathies for
National Socialism were due to the fact that he desired change so intensely that he
became corrupt.
Soon after, the narrator paints a picture for the reader of the aim of the
Mauretanians. The narrator states that “among the aims of the Mauretanians was
artistry in the dealings of this world. They demanded that power should be exercised
dispassionately as by a god, and correspondingly its schools produced a race of spirits
who were bright, untrammeled, but always terrible.”189 Again, it is essential to the topic
to relate this section to its context, and what Jϋnger was actually attempting to portray.
The Mauretanians in On the Marble Cliffs are the followers of Chief Ranger. Thus, if
Chief Ranger represents Adolf Hitler, the Mauretanians logically represent the various
factions and sectors of the Nazi Party, including the S.S. and the Gestapo. What
Jϋnger is discussing in this brief quotation is the exercising and training of the Nazis.
Jϋnger also briefly attacks the thought that liberal deliberation is unnecessary. In
the quote “power should be exercised dispassionately as by a god,”190 Jϋnger seems to
be put off by the theory. Schmitt and Heidegger would most certainly believe that power
should be used in this manner in order to remove the democratic deliberation process.
Although there is another way in which it could be interpreted (as we shall see
momentarily), Jϋnger gives the impression in this quote that the implementation of
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power in such an emotionless manner leads to an almost inhuman state in which there
is a divide between the people and the goals of the regime.
The second part of this quote is also important. The narrator states,
“correspondingly its schools produced a race of spirits who were bright, untrammeled,
but always terrible.”191 This portion of the quote has two connections. First, this quote
is just one example of an ongoing theme of the ruthlessness and emotionless “Nazi”
figures: whether it was ravaging villages or using intimidation to gain political support.
This portion of the quote can also be paralleled to the Rectorship of Martin Heidegger.
As has been previously discussed, Martin Heidegger was elected Rector of the
University of Freiburg by his colleagues. The Nazi Party understood how important it
was to impose their beliefs on the best and brightest young minds of the state. One of
the most efficient ways to implement this intention was to control the information that
was being communicated to university students. Heidegger became one of the leaders
of this operation by essentially creating a sort of “boot camp” for promising students who
were to become future leaders of the Nazi University system.192 Jϋnger is stating that,
while these young minds were supposed to be filled with the knowledge of the world,
they were instead learning only what was communicated to them by Nazi leaders. Not
only were they being taught these ideals and philosophies, but at the same time, Jϋnger
points out that they were being taught how to implement those theories in the worst
possible ways.
When the narrator discusses the thought of resisting the growing party of Chief
Ranger, he states that “many had, indeed, thought of resistance, but in such cases,
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plunderings had occurred which were apparently conducted according to a considered
plan.”193 He also states that “it became clear how weak the law was in comparison to
anarchy.”194 Both of these quotations are important due to the fact that they show how
influential the Nazi Party had become. The first quote suggests that the group would
maliciously put down any resistance, even if it meant murder. The second quote is
more important for our concerns here, for two reasons. On a superficial level it
suggests that the strength of the National Socialist Party had grown to new levels and
that the law was unable to control it. On a deeper level, it is important to examine what
Jϋnger is actually comparing. “Anarchy” in this comparison is undoubtedly the Chief
Ranger, or the National Socialist Party. On another level, Jϋnger is comparing the
NSDAP to “law.” The only logical entity to which Jϋnger could be referring is the
Weimar Republic. Thus, Jϋnger is essentially stating that the Weimar Republic was not
nearly strong enough to withstand any sort of anarchy, especially a group such as the
National Socialists.195 Although these passages may appear to be sympathetic to the
Nazis, it is much more of an attack on the Weimar Republic. Jϋnger is attacking the
legitimacy of the Weimar Republic due to the fact that it could not protect the people
against an uprising. This sentiment is also based upon the fact that the Weimar
Republic succumbed to series of depressions that left the state in shambles.
The narration then turns to the veterans of the war. The narrator details the
routes taken by many of the war veterans:
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Thereupon it became apparent that the men of the Campagna already had their
representatives in the Marina, for returning citizens had either retained business
connections with the herdsmen or joined the clans by taking the blood oath. This
group, too, followed the change for evil, particularly wherever order was already
undermined.196
The inclusion of a discussion concerning the war veterans for Jϋnger is not a surprise,
and it is not difficult to see the most important phrase in this section of writing. “The
blood oath” to which Jϋnger refers in this section of writing has a definite National
Socialist tone. Jϋnger also declares that those veterans who took “the blood oath” also
“followed the change for evil.” This is significant for him due to his affinity towards
veterans of war throughout his career. What Jϋnger is attempting to show within this
section is that even the most pride-filled, virtuous veterans of war were enticed by the
promise and influence that the Nation Socialist commanded.
The narrator then expounds further on the resistance that was shown towards
Chief Ranger and the Mauretanians. The narrator explains:
Soon one had the impression that they hardly regarded one another any longer
as human beings, and their speech was shot through with words fit to be used
only of vermin that must be harried and stamped out with fire and sword. Only in
their opponents could they recognize murder; yet they themselves vaunted of
things which in others they despise. While one held the other’s dead scarcely
worthy of hasty burial in the dead of night, their own were to be shrouded in
purple, the eburnum was to sound out and the eagle soar, bearing to the gods a
living image of the hero and prophet.197
The rhetoric in this sample from On the Marble Cliffs gives an immediate illusion of the
Holocaust; how the Nazis viewed the Jews as “vermin,” not even deserving of a proper
burial due to their “inhuman” race. Although On the Marble Cliffs was composed before
the “Final Solution” in Hitler’s Germany came to its apex, the sentiment of anti-Semitism
196
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was commonplace throughout Germany. Reichspogromnacht had also already
occurred on November 9-10, 1938. As well as the connection that is easily drawn to the
rampant anti-Semitism, which the NSDAP propagated, the secondary issue that is
presented is the manner in which their own were memorialized. The extravagance
described by the narrator appears to be an attempt to express how self-righteous the
NSDAP was. A good example of such self-righteousness is the burial service in which
every member is to be “shrouded in purple, the eburnum was to sound out and the
eagle soar,” and each were to be treated as if they were “a living image of the hero and
prophet.”198 The narrator gives the impression that he is obviously troubled by the
difference in memorials, even though both parties are human.
While Chief Ranger consistently gains popularity and followers, the narrator
makes an assertion. He states that “terror had complete sway under the mask of
order.”199 This is one of the most striking statements that Jϋnger makes through the
entire text. Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists, as well as their fictional counterparts
Chief Ranger and the Mauretanians, are commonly characterized as thugs. They
played the part of the classical corrupt political party using threats and muscle in order
to gain support. Support would increase to the point where the party would also gain
some legitimacy, and with legitimacy, the party would achieve the illusion of order.
While the NSDAP gained an illusion of order, Jϋnger is arguing that it is just that; an
illusion.200
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Chief Ranger is the ultimate antagonist for the narrator. He commands so much
power and authority that he strikes fear into everyone he passes. The text ends with a
battle between Chief Ranger along with the Mauretanians, against the narrator, brother
Ortho, and those of their hermitage. In attempts to depict the power and authority of
Chief Ranger, the narrator states that “To all these [(the Mauretanians)] the Ranger was
lord and master, to be kissed on the hem of his red hunting coat.”201 Not only does this
show the shear amount of authority and respect the Chief Ranger commands from his
followers, but the rhetoric, again shows the connection between Chief Ranger and Adolf
Hitler.
With all of the thinly-veiled criticisms of Nazism that can be found throughout On
the Marble Cliffs, the question that must be posed is why. Why would Ernst Jϋnger, a
man who had so many ideological similarities and wrote several sympathetically
charged articles towards the Nazis in Nationalist periodicals, compose such an
allegory? Perhaps the most reasonable response would be that Jϋnger, at the time of
composition, had become increasingly critical of the Nazis. As previously discussed,
Jϋnger did not agree with everything the National Socialists were doing to gain power or
their social visions once power was obtained. He believed that they were unnecessarily
forceful in gaining and enforcing their power. Due to this, it would not be unreasonable
to think that Jϋnger could write a novel such as On the Marble Cliffs in order to question
the Nazi Party and their policies.
Jϋnger desired changed in Germany, not unlike much of the rest of the German
people during the Weimar Republic. When a radical group such as the NSDAP
emerged and began to grow, many German people saw a glimpse of hope—that the
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NSDAP would be able to overthrow the centrally weak Weimar Republic. Although
Weimar was overthrown, the NSDAP proved to be much more radical than the German
people had initially expected and hoped for. For Jϋnger not only were some of the
policies they put in place too aggressive, but the basic means by which they gained
power was also much too aggressive. These are the issues that Jϋnger is dealing with
in On the Marble Cliffs.
Another question that must be explained is how the text became available to the
public at all. One explanation that Elliot Neaman offers is that Jϋnger incorporated
enough National Socialist ideals throughout the text in order for Nazi officials to permit
the text. Another possible factor was that Hitler held a great affinity for Jϋnger. It is
improbable, but possible that Hitler could have protected Jϋnger from persecution for
the text, as well as kept the text in print due to his admiration for the writer, and due to
Jϋnger’s past support of the nationalistic sympathies paralleled by the NSDAP.

Looking Back

The discussion concerning Ernst Jϋnger is one full of controversy. Of the three
intellectuals examined in this study, his ideologies may have had the most similarities
with those of National Socialism. Although this may be the case, he is also the only one
of the three intellectuals who did not officially join the National Socialist Party for any
period of time.
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Central to this examination is the discussion of Jϋnger’s apparent shift in views.
The first indication of his political and philosophical ideals found in Storm of Steel
suggests a glorification of war and struggle that is very comparable to the view of the
NSDAP. This glorification of war is what Jϋnger is commonly notorious for, but is
generally a superficial and incomplete description of his views on war. The original
version of Storm of Steel argued that the event of war is an experience based upon the
individual. Whereas the Nazi Party portrayed war as a national experience, Jϋnger
believed that war is to be made by the individuals that were fighting it; the experience of
war should be expressed by the men who lived and died, and the personal
achievements that were made.
An apparent shift, most reasonably caused by Jϋnger’s personal abhorrence for
the Weimar Republic and bureaucracy as a whole, then occurred. As opposed to
celebrating the individual experience of war in Storm of Steel, Jϋnger essentially altered
a primary premise of his text; he added more nationalist rhetoric. The most evident is
the addition of the last lines of the text which read, “We stand for what will be and for
what has been. Though force without and barbarity within conglomerate in sombre
clouds, yet so long as the blade of a sword will strike a spark in the night may it be said :
Germany lives and Germany shall never go under!”202 The addition of such
nationalistically charged elements increases the similarities between Jϋnger and
National Socialism for obvious reasons. No longer did he argue that war was solely an
individual experience, but also a national experience.
This increase in nationalist tendencies is rooted in his disdain for the Weimar
Republic. The rapid growth in popularity of the NSDAP as well as their radical views
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enticed Jϋnger to compose essays and articles which were commonly found in a variety
of nationalist journals and periodicals. The vast majority of these articles urged the
support for nationalist parties in their attempts to change the German state. In 1923,
Jϋnger published his first article in the NSDAP’s daily newspaper, the Völkischer
Beobachter. In the article entitled “Revolution and Idea,” Jϋnger condemns the
“annoying spectacle”203 of the Weimar Republic. He states,
“The real revolution has not yet occurred. Its forward march cannot be halted…its idea
is the völkische, sharpened to as yet unknown hardness, its banner is the swastika, its
expression is the concentration of the will in a single point—the dictatorship.”204 Not
only is Jϋnger condemning the Republic as early as 1923, but he is also advocating a
dictatorship under the symbol of the swastika.
The National Socialists then presumably lost Jϋnger’s interest. Nikolaus
Wachsmann examines how the relationship between Jϋnger and the Nazis had become
strained. He argues that the majority of the tension was caused by the relationship that
Hitler and the Nazis maintained with democratic states. Wachsmann believes that
Jϋnger saw this as entirely unacceptable. He states “his stance ruled out any cooperation with the Weimar state and the bourgeois system, once more highlighting the
influence of war on Jϋnger’s attitude towards politics. He saw no room for compromise,
neither on the battlefield nor in politics.”205 Though Wachsmann argues this position for
Jϋnger’s stance in the early to mid-1920s, Jϋnger’s text On the Marble Cliffs shows an
opposing disposition.
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On the Marble Cliffs, an allegory notably published after the National Socialists
assumed power, provides another shift for Jϋnger. Whereas Wachsmann argues that
Jϋnger believed that the Nazis were not being radical enough in the 1920s, this allegory
portrays a Jϋnger in the 1930s as believing the Nazis were much too radical, specifically
in their attempts to ascertain authority. On the Marble Cliffs is essentially an attack on
the legitimacy of Nazi power. Elliot Neaman refers to this attack as the “Jϋnger-debate”
as his intentions are not clear,206 but there is a definite attack on the legitimacy of Nazi
authority due to Nazi abuse of power.
Ernst Jϋnger made a name for himself with The Storm of Steel which launched
his intellectual and writing career. The magnitude of his popularity is noteworthy in this
examination due to the amount of influence that he would be able to exploit. Particularly
in his texts from the 1920s-30s, the nationalist tendencies are both abundant and
essential. Jϋnger also exploited his popularity to endorse radical nationalism. As has
been pointed out, although he did not endorse National Socialism exclusively, he did
endorse many of the principles the Nazis supported.
With the last major shift in Jϋnger’s ideals, he was able to attack the legitimacy of
Nazi power in Germany. On the Marble Cliffs was able to reach the same audience of
readers from Jϋnger’s past, but also attract a new audience as well; National
Socialism’s opponents. This text is not only an attack on Nazi programs, but it can also
easily be comprehended as a call for resistance against further persecution at Nazi
hands.
The influence of Ernst Jϋnger is undeniable. From Storm of Steel, through the
nationalist periodicals in which he published many articles, to On the Marble Cliffs, he
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was able to amass a large and diverse audience for his opinions and views.
Contextually, his audience was in a similar situation as Jϋnger was himself. He surely
maintained a strong following from war veterans for obvious reasons. Along with his
military brethren, with whom he shared the experience of the trenches, he also certainly
had an audience in those who yearned for a change from the constant depressions and
inflations under the Weimar Republic. Subsequently, he also ascertained an anti-Nazi
audience from On the Marble Cliffs. With these audiences in mind, the influence that
Ernst Jϋnger had is indisputable.
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CONCLUSION

Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Jϋnger were indisputably influential
during Weimar and National Socialist Germany. Though they used different styles and,
at times, different mediums, there are various similarities between these three men.
Although they took different life and career paths, these differences, in several cases,
led them to similar arguments. In conclusion, these similarities, along with some
differences, will be examined in order to illustrate how all three of them provided a
foundation for popularizing conservative revolutionary ideas.
One of the most glaring similarities that can be seen through texts of Schmitt,
Heidegger, and Jϋnger is the call for a dictator. Schmitt composed his text The Dictator
in which he explains historically how a strong authority figure can legitimately gain
power on behalf of the people. Heidegger describes, in Being and Time, how and why
a strong leader would be necessary in his process of creating a “community of destiny.”
This leader would be essential to the process in order to keep the renewed and
“authentic” people on course. This leader would mold the people’s Weltanschauung,
effectively creating a homogenous society that would be able to uncritically conform to a
single leader. Jϋnger dedicated much of Storm of Steel to the idea of leadership and
discipline. Throughout the text Jϋnger repeatedly states the importance of leadership
qualities and aestheticizes and glorifies the theme of following a powerful leader through
tough times.
Along with these suggestions concerning centralized power and dictatorship,
come their oppositions to parliamentary procedure. Schmitt specifically has a
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pronounced distaste for the entire institution of liberal parliament. In The Crisis of
Parliamentary Democracy Schmitt criticizes the basis of parliament: representative
deliberation. Heidegger echoes this sentiment with his discussion of creating a
“community of destiny.” When he discusses the process of the “authentic” people
coming together in order to form a renewed and united community in the last third of
Being and Time, he is essentially stripping them of all political representation. Although
Heidegger would surely argue that the community as a whole would have the same
political desires, it is a thinly veiled attack on liberal deliberation, illustrating that through
such a process riddled with compromises, the community as a whole is unsatisfied.
Jϋnger also attacks the process of representative deliberation. In the mind of Jϋnger,
he views that in politics, just as in war, there is no time or reason for deliberation and
compromise. In Storm of Steel and Der Arbeiter, Jϋnger illustrates that decisions and
politics should be decided by the few in power. In his earlier works, he glorifies
decisions made dispassionately by those in power because unemotional decisions are
the greatest decisions.
The theme of mortality is another similarity that is found within the texts of Martin
Heidegger and Ernst Jϋnger. Mortality, for Jϋnger, plays a major role for his process of
creating a renewed nation. The second stage in his renewal process was recovering
one’s individual self and authenticity by facing one’s mortality. Realizing one’s mortality,
for Heidegger, is the only way to become “authentic” and thus join the renewed
“community of destiny.” This importance on mortality is paralleled by Jϋnger in Storm of
Steel. In the text Jϋnger strongly suggests that an individual cannot be considered alive
until that individual personally faces the prospect of death.
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Another important parallel that can be seen between the writings of Heidegger
and Jϋnger is the eventual dissolution of individuality. In the first sections of Being and
Time, Heidegger calls for the radically individualized, “authentic” Dasein. In the last
sections Heidegger calls for a collectivized Dasein of the “community of destiny.” This
transformation that is seen in Being and Time is also seen in Jϋnger’s Storm of Steel.
In the first edition of the text, Jϋnger stresses the importance of individuality and
individual experiences and achievements. The 1924 edition of Storm of Steel shows a
transformation similar to the one that Heidegger would later call for. The 1924 edition
includes an extreme nationalistic tenor, specifically located within the final lines of the
text.
Perhaps the most important parallel that is vivid throughout the writings and life
paths of Schmitt, Heidegger, and Jϋnger is their outright abhorrence of the Weimar
Republic. With the exception of Carl Schmitt’s rather lackluster claims later in life that
he supported the Weimar Republic while it was in effect, all three of these men
vehemently opposed the ideals upon which the republic was based. Through all of their
writings there are attacks posed against Weimar; specifically against a representative,
parliamentary style government. Schmitt was one of the strongest in his opposition to
the liberal parliamentary system. Heidegger also launched attacks against the
representative style government through his writings, although they were in
philosophical format. Jϋnger also attacked the Weimar Republic, but using a different
technique. In Storm of Steel Jϋnger appealed to the emotional baggage carried over
after the loss of World War I in the minds of soldiers and the workforce at the home
front.
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Although done in different techniques, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst
Jϋnger, all played an influential role in the growth of National Socialist tendencies during
Weimar and National Socialist Germany. Although they certainly did not put Hitler and
the Nazi Party in power, just as certainly they had an impact in propagating and
legitimizing National Socialist thought. As Geoff Eley, Peter Fritzsche, and other
historians have demonstrated,207 fascism in Germany developed out of a radical, rightwing populist nationalism, which was hostile not just to the parliamentary democracy of
the Weimar Republic, but also to the elitism of traditional conservative politics. There
were, in other words, deep divisions between conservative elites and fascist rebels in
the 1920s. But Schmitt, Heidegger, Jϋnger, and other conservative revolutionary
intellectuals expressed a radical critique of Weimar in terms with which both
conservative elites and fascist could identify.208 In this way, conservative revolutionary
intellectuals helped make possible the rapprochement between elites and fascists,
which was a necessary condition for the National Socialists’ rise to power.
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